Paving the way to EU enlargement Assessing economic trends and future prospects
Summary
Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine created renewed momentum for EU enlargement. As the European Parliament highlights, enlargement is a key driver for long‑term stability, security and economic development. Economic output per person has increased over the past two decades across the Western Balkans, Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. However, convergence with the EU remains low. Without stronger reform and investment, full convergence and integration could be delayed by several decades. Foreign direct investment inflows are high in the enlargement countries examined, but not consistently directed to sectors that support long‑term growth. Trade integration with the EU has deepened significantly, supported by existing agreements. The EU remains the main trade partner for the enlargement countries examined, and has benefited from these relations, including agricultural trade with Ukraine. Trade patterns across countries and sectors remain uneven, and exposure to other global actors, particularly China, has increased in some cases. Enlargement countries perform well in terms of digital infrastructure. However, significant gaps remain in regulatory frameworks and innovation capacity, which is critical to adopting artificial intelligence. Progress in aligning with the EU acquis and deeper integration into the EU market could support increased trade and investment, while contributing to faster economic convergence.
Introduction
Enlargement is a political priority for the EU and its Member States, made more pressing by geopolitical shifts and the destabilising effects of the war in Ukraine. The European Parliament is a strong advocate of EU enlargement. In a 2026 resolution, it recalls that 'previous rounds [of EU enlargement] have delivered the greatest benefits for economic growth and competitiveness', and 'insists that EU enlargement will strengthen Europe's security and economy'.
A 2025 EPRS briefing investigated the extent of convergence in a wide range of indicators for EU Member States and enlargement countries. This analysis delves deeper into the economic, budgetary, trade and digital developments of the enlargement countries, which include:1
The economic criteria, part of the 1993 Copenhagen criteria, make the existence of a 'functioning market economy [in acceding countries] as well as [their] capacity to cope with competitive pressures and market forces within the Union' a requirement for joining the EU. Making progress in meeting the economic criteria has become one of the 'fundamentals' of the EU accession process, and in essence refers to macroeconomic stability, a welcoming business environment, functioning labour and financial markets, infrastructure, innovation and economic integration with the EU and the world.
Relevant policy actions to support accession
The aspiring members are at different stages of the EU accession process, with some having candidate status for more than 20 years.4 The EU has progressively moved beyond trade relations and financial assistance to these countries, developing new approaches and instruments to facilitate economic convergence and investment in the regions. Building on the February 2020 revised enlargement methodology and following the June 2022 European Council conclusions, these new instruments are meant to support the enlargement countries in their 'gradual integration [into the EU] during the enlargement process itself in a reversible and merit‑based manner' and therefore accelerate their economic convergence with Member States. The European Parliament has strongly supported this move.
Since the 2000s, with the launch of the Stabilisation and Association Process and the Eastern Partnership Initiative, countries in the Western Balkans and the Eastern Trio have gradually deepened their economic, financial and political ties with the EU through preferential trade arrangements, domestic reforms, financial assistance, regulatory alignment, and participation in flagship EU programmes.
The EU concluded bilateral Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAAs) with each of the Western Balkan partners between 2004 and 2016. In parallel, the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas (DCFTAs), established as the economic and trade pillars of broader Association Agreements, have been provisionally applied with Georgia and Moldova since 2014 and in full force since 2016, while the DCFTA with Ukraine has been provisionally applied since 2016 and entered fully into force in 2017. The agreements have played a key role in facilitating access to the EU single market and strengthening economic and trade relations, providing a framework for alignment with the EU acquis. The SAAs and DCFTAs seek to simplify customs procedures, promote gradual approximation of legislation, and remove most of the existing tariffs, notably on industrial goods. While SAAs and DCFTAs could be considered comparable in terms of scope, they differ in their design. According to an expert, the DCFTAs apply a 'more lenient approach to intra‑regional cooperation' compared with the SAAs but remain more rigid in terms of the approximation of laws. However, the same expert argues that 'there is no indication that the differences in legal governance have translated into stronger economic performance in the [Eastern Partnership] countries or greater integration with the EU, compared to the Western Balkans' (see trade section below).
The fostering of gradual integration into the single market has been complemented by EU pre‑accession and macro‑economic assistance. Since 2007, the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) has been the main EU external financing tool for supporting political, institutional and economic reforms in the enlargement region (mainly WB6 and Türkiye) with financial and technical assistance. Currently, the EU is implementing IPA III for the years 2021 to 2027, with an envelope of €14.1 billion allocated to the WB6 and Türkiye. The Eastern Trio countries have also benefited from EU assistance through multiple initiatives, including the Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument (NDICI–Global Europe) and its predecessors. The NDICI–Global Europe allocation for the Eastern Trio countries for the years 2021 to 2024 has been set at €1.2 billion, supporting economic development across the region. Through the Economic and Investment Plan for the Eastern Partnership, launched in 2021, the EU has channelled public and private investment into the Eastern Trio countries to support flagship projects, jointly identified with partner countries, including in sectors such as transport, financing for small and medium‑sized enterprises (SMEs), climate action and digital. However, these initiatives were designed before Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine.
The war in Ukraine, while accelerating the granting of candidate status to the Eastern Trio and Bosnia and Herzegovina, has posed significant challenges – primarily to Ukraine but also to all the other enlargement countries examined. Impacts have included economic slowdown, budgetary imbalances, trade volatility and rising energy prices, albeit to different extents. To respond to these challenges, new initiatives have been launched to accelerate economic convergence with the EU, attract public and private investment, provide incentives for reforms, and thus support the gradual integration of the enlargement countries into the EU.
In that context, the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans and its Reform and Growth Facility (worth €6 billion) came into force in May 2024. Compared with IPA III, the Facility shifts from a cost‑reimbursement model to a results-based payment system, and it is time‑bound (funding runs until 2027). The Facility has aimed to equalise the relationship between the WB6 and the EU, since the national reform agendas have been crafted by and agreed with the WB6 governments. It also requires that the WB6 countries align with the EU's common foreign and security policy. The Facility complements IPA III funding, focusing on facilitating economic convergence and supporting administrative and institutional capacity‑building. Crucially, access to the EU's single market is conditional on progress in intra‑regional economic cooperation through the Common Regional Market. Investments are channelled through complementary initiatives such as the Western Balkans Investment Framework and the Economic and Investment Plan for the Western Balkans, with the support of EU financial institutions, such as the European Investment Bank (EIB).
The Growth Plan for Moldova followed in March 2025, with its Reform and Growth Facility of €1.8 billion (for the years 2025 to 2027) entering into force in May 2025. It was designed similarly to the Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, with the disbursement of grants and loans based on the completion of the necessary reforms as agreed in the Reform Agenda. The Facility is partially financed with resources from the NDICI–Global Europe, primarily from the financial allocation for the Eastern Neighbourhood. The objective of the Plan and the underpinned Facility is to accelerate socioeconomic and fundamental reforms, as well as Moldova's access to the EU single market, thereby fostering economic convergence with the EU.
As identified in NDICI–Global Europe's mid-term evaluation, despite its flexibility, the instrument 'was not designed to support countries at war at the scale needed by Ukraine'. Therefore, the Ukraine Facility entered into force in March 2024 to support Ukraine's efforts to sustain macro‑financial stability, promote its recovery, and support reforms with a view to future EU membership. The Facility, which replaces support provided through the NDICI–Global Europe instrument, is set for a four‑year period (2024‑2027), and is endowed with €50 billion in grants and loans. Its implementation is based on the Ukraine Plan, which outlines the reforms and the framework for the disbursement of funds. The Ukraine Facility is part of the EU response to financially assist the country in the face of Russia's war of aggression,5 which also encompasses macro‑financial assistance and financing under EU guarantees coming from the EIB, among other institutions.6
Economic output has grown, but convergence is low
Data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) indicate that economic output per person increased between 2004 and 2024 in all the enlargement countries examined, albeit to differing extents. As shown in Figure 1, economic growth more than doubled in Georgia (227 %), while higher growth was also observed in Kosovo, Albania and Moldova (140 %, 125 % and 115 % respectively).7 In comparison, the economic output per person in the EU‑27 increased by about 27 % over the same time period.
These data (Figure 1) suggest that there has been some economic convergence between the enlargement countries and the EU. This convergence could be due, in part, to EU policy actions to support accession, which are outlined above. Nevertheless, the degree of convergence is considered low. With respect to the WB6, the World Bank noted that per‑capita economic output since the financial crisis has not been sufficient to 'drive meaningful convergence'. Assuming that the trend since the global financial crisis continues, a 2024 European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) study estimates that the WB6 will not achieve full convergence with the EU before 2093. Economic convergence could be reached by 2045 if growth rates were to increase to levels achieved before the global financial crisis.8
An analysis finds that there has also been some degree of convergence for the Eastern Trio countries except for Ukraine, which experienced periods of de‑convergence due to the global financial crisis (2009), political instability (2013‑2015) and the war of Russian aggression (2022 on).
Reflections on economic convergence could also take account of the evidence from earlier waves of EU enlargement. Economic output per person of the EU‑10, following the 2004 'big bang' enlargement, was about half (49 %) that of the existing EU Member States at the time.9 In comparison, in 2024, the average per‑capita income in the Western Balkan and the Eastern Trio countries was 43 % and 31 % of the EU‑27 respectively.10
The implementation of significant reforms, investment and EU accession could help to accelerate growth and convergence. The European Commission claims that the Common Regional Market would lead to a 10 % increase in the regional GDP of the Western Balkan economies. Projection estimates from a 2023 World Bank study suggest that the GDP of the Western Balkans could increase 73 % by 2034, assuming that the Growth Plan effectively supports an intensified EU accession process.11
The Commission also set a target for the EU Growth Plan for Moldova to 'double its economy over the coming decade'. To achieve this target, Moldova would need to have an annual growth rate of 7.2 %, which it did, indeed, achieve at some points before the global financial crisis. A 2025 study for the European Parliament argues that this scale of economic growth in Moldova is unlikely 'even in a favourable external environment', as it would require 'extraordinary absorption capabilities and reform advancements in several fields'.
Regarding the Ukraine Facility, the Commission estimates that Ukraine's GDP could increase by 6.2 % by 2027 and by 14.2 % by 2040. In its amendments to the Commission proposal to establish the Ukraine Facility, the European Parliament had called for reducing economic and social inequalities, promoting territorial cohesion, and supporting upward economic convergence towards EU standards.
Trade has surged, and supply chains have shortened
Eurostat data show that the two decades since 2007 have seen EU trade with both the WB6 and the Eastern Trio countries expand substantially, although their trajectories differ markedly (see Figure 2). The EU's dominance as a partner in trade in goods for both the WB6 and the Eastern Trio has deepened during this period, albeit with notable asymmetries and some country‑level exceptions.
Trade volumes between the EU and the WB6 withstood the initial shock of the financial crisis and the subsequent euro‑area sovereign debt crisis, increasing – exponentially for trade in goods – particularly after the COVID‑19 pandemic.12 Over the past decade alone, EU–Western Balkans trade in goods has more than doubled, rising by 122.3 % by 2025 (over €87.6 billion). EU trade in services with the WB6 has grown in parallel, although it remains smaller in scale. Because of its industrially diversified economy – the largest in the region – Serbia stands out as the EU's biggest trade partner among the WB6. Overall, EU–Serbia trade (goods at €46.5 billion, in 2025; services at €8.3 billion, in 2024) is worth almost four times the EU trade with North Macedonia, the EU's second biggest trade partner in the region.
For the Eastern Trio, the picture is shaped dramatically by geopolitics. The COVID‑19 pandemic caused a sharp albeit short‑lived dip for all partners in 2020, while Russia's full‑scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 acted as a structural shock that reoriented trade flows for Ukraine and Moldova away from Russia and towards the EU. EU–Ukraine trade increased exponentially, in particular trade in goods, more than doubling since the DCFTA provisionally entered into force in 2016. Moldova's bilateral trade turnover has similarly surged, reaching 2.5 times the volume of trade since 2016, when the EU–Moldova DCFTA came into full effect. Georgia is the smallest EU trade partner in volume, growing steadily since the DCFTA provisionally entered into force in 2014. Nevertheless, since the election of the Georgian Dream party, in October 2024, EU exports to Georgia have remained at a standstill, a trend likely linked to the Georgian Dream government's drift away from EU integration, and its deepening informal ties with Russia.
More specifically, Serbia's key export sectors include energy, information and communications technology (ICT), the automotive industry, machinery, mining, and agriculture, while North Macedonia has evolved into a particularly deep production base for EU industrial supply chains, driven by automotive components and electrical equipment. This is very different from Albania, which leans more on raw materials and low‑value textiles, or Montenegro, which is tourism‑heavy and import‑dependent in goods. Tourism is the most important economic sector in both Albania and Montenegro, accounting for 21.5 % and 25.6 % of employment respectively in 2023, which explains why services exports (notably travel), rather than goods, dominate their trade with the EU. Bosnia and Herzegovina's goods exports to the EU centre on agri‑food products, mechanical appliances, and mining and metals, as is the case for Kosovo, which remains the region's weakest trader with the EU. Its economy is heavily dependent on remittances to balance a persistent goods deficit.
Moldova followed by Ukraine top the trend in the Eastern Trio regarding the move to a services economy. However, Ukraine's profile in exports, including to the EU, is heavily agricultural. This has been much debated at EU level and is a concern for certain Member States (see Box 1). In 2025, the share of EU agri‑food imports from Ukraine stood at 48.9 %, followed by iron and steel (12.4 %), mechanical appliances and electrical equipment (9.1 %), and ores, slag and ash (6.4 %).
Box 1 – EU–Ukraine DCFTA and Ukraine's agriculture sector
The EU–Ukraine DCFTA, provisionally applied since 2016, partially liberalised Ukrainian agricultural exports to the EU. This led to the EU replacing Russia as Ukraine's main trading partner. Total trade in goods between the EU and Ukraine reached €68.1 billion in 2025, more than doubling since the DCFTA's entry into force. While Ukrainian industrial product exports have struggled to compete in the EU market, agricultural exports rose progressively, despite the quotas and tariffs in the DCFTA on certain products. However, EU agri-food imports from Ukraine decreased in 2024 and 2025 compared with previous years, while EU agri‑food exports to Ukraine continued to increase, up 17.4 % from 2024 (totalling €4.3 billion in 2025). Brazil, the United Kingdom (UK) and the United States (US) are the top three EU agri‑food import sources, with Ukraine falling to fourth place.
Figure 3 illustrates the trajectory of those agri‑food products that the EU has most exported to and imported from Ukraine since the DCFTA's provisional application. Although the EU is trading at a deficit, it has benefited from the DCFTA: EU agri‑food exports have followed an upward trend, although they saw a decline across the board in 2022 due to Russia's invasion of Ukraine. By contrast, EU imports have experienced more volatility, particularly since the war in Ukraine, with EU imports of fats and oils (at 32.3 %) surpassing those of cereals (at 21.3 %).
To counteract this trade imbalance, in October 2025, the DCFTA was upgraded to better integrate Ukraine into the EU single market, while addressing the economic impact of the war in Ukraine and protecting sensitive EU agricultural sectors. The temporary trade liberalisation measures, in place since 2022, expired in June 2025 and were replaced by a new and more restrictive safeguard mechanism. The strictest automatic safeguards ('emergency brake') apply to poultry, eggs, sugar, oats, maize, groats and honey. This mechanism enables the EU and Ukraine to mitigate 'negative impacts of liberalisation at regional and sectoral levels' by separating flours from raw cereals, fully liberalising some processed derivatives (chocolate products, modified starches, mushrooms, sugar syrups, yoghurts, food preparations), and using tariff rate quotas (TRQs) to favour trade of complementary products while restricting access to raw/bulk cereals (wheat, maize, barley). The upgraded DCFTA also aimed to respond to Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia's concerns regarding risks of a disproportionate share of Ukrainian imports flooding their market by providing reciprocally broader market access compared with the original DCFTA.
The literature paints a mixed picture of the potential trends of imports and exports of agri‑food under the upgraded DCFTA. The 2025 German Economic Team (GET) quantitative export impact study finds that changes in the TRQs bring long‑term predictability regarding access to the EU market. The effect is most pronounced for honey, sugar, barley and bran. Overall, the upgraded DCFTA's impact falls overwhelmingly on raw wheat (80 % projected loss), while processed derivatives fare comparatively better (through expanded TRQs or full liberalisation). CEPS argues that, while 'Ukraine will remain a net agri‑food exporter' to the EU, 'its trade surplus is expected to shrink … tilting the balance in the EU's favour'. Joint Research Centre (JRC) scenario projections on EU agri‑food trade in 2032 validate this projection, estimating the share of EU agri‑food imports from Ukraine under trade liberalisation scenarios at 3.2 % (conservative variant) or 3.1 % (ambitious variant) compared with the business‑as‑usual scenario at 33 %. The share of EU agri‑food exports to Ukraine would remain stable (at 0.9 %) in all projected scenarios.
The share of EU exports to Ukraine is significant – and so are the sectors affected. Main sectors include arms and ammunition (up by as much as 46 740 % compared with 2015), mineral fuels (up by 427 %), motor vehicles (up by 528 %) and electrical machinery (up by 208 %) – sectors that have shifted because of wartime reconstruction needs. In 2025, the EU export share to Moldova largely consisted of mineral fuels (29.3 %), machinery (17.3 %), agri‑food products (12.7 %) and motor vehicles (10.7 %). The EU import share from Moldova (overall half the volume of EU exports) was led by agri‑food products (43.2 % in 2025) and machinery and electrical equipment (21.4 %), followed, at a lower scale, by textiles, iron and steel, and furniture. The EU import share from Georgia is even narrower, dominated historically by crude materials and beverages. EU exports to Georgia, however, are far larger – €4.3 billion against €872 million in 2025 – reflecting Georgia's role as a net importer of EU industrial goods.
As enlargement has faltered with the WB6, the region has developed trading routes with a wider set of suppliers – particularly China, Türkiye and Russia (see Figure 4). In 2025, the EU accounted for 56.1 % of the WB6's total trade, while the region's share of overall EU trade is only 1.7 %. Historically, the EU's share in WB6's trade was even higher: between 2017 and 2021, 81‑83.1 % of Western Balkan exports went to the EU, while only 2.8‑4.2 % went to Russia, 0.8‑2.9 % to China, and 2‑2.6 % to Türkiye. Germany and Italy are the main EU trade partners with the region, both in trade in goods (19.7 % and 12.5% respectively in 2025) and trade in services (13.9 % and 12.3 % respectively in 2024). Both surpass Russia's and China's share in trade with the Western Balkan region. Nevertheless, despite the overwhelming EU trade footprint in the region, China's presence has grown substantially, with its share up from 5.9 % in 2019 to 9.5 % in 2025. Serbia provides the most telling example of evolving multi‑vector trade relations. According to IMF data, Germany remains Serbia's main trading partner, with trade in goods amounting to US$9.7 billion, or 11.9 % of Serbia's total trade in goods in 2025. However, China has become a growing trade partner for Serbia since a free trade agreement entered into force in 2025. Through its Belt and Road initiative, China has become the largest importer of Serbia's extractive and raw materials (to a lesser degree from Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and North Macedonia) and concentrated its investments on industrial and transport infrastructure (also in Bosnia and Herzegovina) and foreign direct investment (FDI) (at 9 % in 2024). Moreover, the WB6 have cooperated with China's Digital Silk Road to varying degrees, with Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina being the most dependent. As a result, some experts have called for a clear 'China conditionality' in the EU's enlargement policy, arguing that China remains largely absent from accession talks. In parallel, Russia slipped a place among the Western Balkans' top trade in goods partners in 2025, dropping from third to fourth place (behind Türkiye) compared with 2019.
Foreign direct investment inflows are high, but not always directed to high‑value sectors
All Western Balkan countries have also established special economic zones (SEZs) to attract manufacturing investment, although the zones differ in terms of their ownership and management, and the incentives offered. Some experts argue that this has had a limited impact on spillover to the local economy because of import‑intensity of production. There are also seven free economic zones in Moldova and four free industrial zones in Georgia. Proposals have been put forward to introduce SEZs in Ukraine as part of the country's reconstruction.
The GEO-POWER-EU project suggests that the EU is the largest contributor to FDI inflows in all enlargement countries, while China, Russia, Türkiye and the US play a more minor role.14 Other experts suggest that, as with trade (see above), China's influence has grown significantly across the enlargement countries, particularly in Serbia and Georgia. The European Parliament has expressed concern about the 'long‑term consequences [of other global actors' role in the region] for economic security and European interests'.
Participation in EU programmes and approximation of laws could promote FDI inflows for the enlargement countries. In that context, joining the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA), which the European Parliament welcomes, could reduce the cost of financial transfers and attract FDI.15 The World Bank estimates the savings for the Western Balkans alone could reach up to €500 million a year while also deepening integration with EU financial markets.
In the first month since joining the SEPA, transactions to and from Moldova increased by €300 million, with direct savings of approximately €1.4 million. The estimated savings for Ukraine joining the SEPA could reach between €70 million and €100 million each year. While the Commission considers meeting this benchmark 'a practical example of the impact' of the Growth Plans for the two regions, some experts dispute that the SEPA is a 'gamechanger', and urge for increased investment in the region.
Preparedness for AI and digitalisation is uneven
Artificial intelligence (AI) has a large potential to transform economies by shifting production frontiers and altering the allocation between labour and capital. The impact of AI on the future of work features prominently in academic and policy debates, including in the European Parliament. The IMF has developed an AI Preparedness Index (AIPI), using data from official sources and surveys, to support countries in harnessing AI's potential while mitigating its risks. Figure 6 shows country‑level scores for AIPI's three dimensions, or sub‑indices. The higher the score, the higher the level of preparedness.
The digital infrastructure sub‑index reflects a country's capacity to adopt ICT and to address cybersecurity risks. Among the enlargement countries, Serbia is the most advanced in converging to the EU (0.60 versus 0.68). The Eastern Trio countries score higher than the other Western Balkan countries. According to the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), Ukraine ranks fifth in the world for the government's use of technology to deliver public services. The EU supports digital infrastructure in enlargement countries (except in Georgia) primarily through the Digital Europe programme. European Digital Innovation Hubs, which serve as one‑stop shops to support companies and public administration in testing and scaling up digital solutions, are present in Albania (5), Kosovo (1), Montenegro (1), North Macedonia (4), Serbia (6) and Ukraine (12).
Regarding the other two sub‑indices concerning legal frameworks and innovation, Georgia stands out for its high scores as compared with the other enlargement countries. This may be due in part to the streamlined and market-friendly nature of its regulations. Albania's high score on the innovation and economic integration sub‑index may be driven by the advanced development of research and technology clusters. In contrast, clusters are less well‑developed and identified as a weakness in Moldova and Montenegro.16
The European Innovation Scoreboard, which benchmarks research and innovation performance across countries, finds steady improvement in all represented countries between 2018 and 2025 except for Moldova, which has been backsliding since 2023. Key factors contributing to this trend include a decline in patent applications, employment in innovative enterprises, and collaboration between innovative SMEs. The EU supports research and innovation in all enlargement countries through its Horizon Europe programme. Funding provided to enlargement countries during the 2021‑2025 period has reached €262.1 million (€179.5 million to the WB6 and €82.6 million to the Eastern Trio).17
Financing the next round of enlargement
Looking towards the next round of EU enlargement, some studies have investigated how the EU's long‑term budget, the multiannual financial framework (MFF), would need to be adapted. A 2025 study conducted for the European Parliament estimated that, in the event of EU enlargement, some current Member States could receive lower allocations, depending on the planning and speed of the enlargement process. A 2024 analysis by Bruegel found that applying the current EU budget rules to an enlarged EU would imply an increase in the EU's budget from 1.12 % to 1.23 % of EU GDP.18 Another analysis, prepared by the European Policy Centre and the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, concluded that, although the cost of integrating the Western Balkans via the MFF and Next Generation EU (NGEU) is small relative to the EU's financial capacity, accession could lead to a four‑fold increase in support compared with IPA III. Studies have also addressed how to absorb Ukraine's large agriculture sector and temper its impact on the common agricultural policy (CAP) (see Box 2).
Box 2 – Cost of Ukraine's agriculture sector on the CAP and possible mitigation strategies
Studies and internal EU estimates have tried to quantify the potential costs to EU Member States from integrating Ukraine's agriculture under the CAP if Ukraine joins the EU. These costs largely result from Ukraine's vast arable land (around 37.2 million hectares, exceeding that of France and Spain, the two EU Member States with the largest share of utilised agricultural areas). An internal Council paper reportedly estimates that Ukraine's membership would cost the EU €96.5 billion in CAP payments over seven years, resulting in a 20 % reduction in farm subsidies for current Member States. The Bruegel analysis mentioned earlier projects entitlements of around €85 billion from the CAP over an MFF period, forming the largest component of the total estimated cost of accession (€136 billion). Another study's lower estimates puts the cost of bringing Ukraine into the CAP as ranging between €70 billion and €90 billion (still more than any Member State recipient of CAP support). A 2022 study by the Tallinn‑based International Centre for Defence and Security (ICDS) arrives at a lower 'static' estimate of between €18 and €19 billion in annual net budget receipts for Ukraine, comparing the country's profile with Poland and Romania scaled to Ukraine's size. A 2024 ICDS study projects that the EU budget would need to increase by approximately 0.10‑0.13 % of EU GDP per year to accommodate Ukraine's accession – a figure the authors describe as 'manageable' within the context of the broader economic benefits of enlargement. According to the above‑mentioned 2025 study for the European Parliament, in the absence of an upper ceiling for the CAP, as well as changes to the distribution approach, the total CAP budget could increase by 25 %.
Some of these studies, however, do not consider possible reforms to mitigate the fiscal redistribution risks, EU absorption capacity issues, or medium‑ and long‑term macroeconomic benefits to the EU market. Nevertheless, possible solutions for accommodating Ukraine's large agricultural sector – strengthening its production, while benefiting from the opportunity to shorten EU supply chains – have been put forward. Some experts suggest that reforming the CAP is inevitable in order to decouple production and favour sustainability. Others maintain that Ukraine could strengthen the EU's agricultural sector by using transition periods and capping mechanisms to alleviate Ukraine's effects on the CAP. In the latter case, Ukraine's agriculture could have a 'special status' in the EU, allowing it to continue large‑scale agri‑food exports to non‑EU countries while caps remain on its exports to the EU; Ukraine would be treated as an equal member in other accession clusters. The case for a 'special status' for Ukraine's agriculture was recently also put forward by Germany and France. Another possible pathway would be to transform Ukrainian agricultural production by incentivising investment in Ukrainian bioeconomy and food processing, thereby ensuring that it is complementary to EU markets.
As part of the European Commission's proposal for the 2028‑2034 MFF, the proposed Global Europe regulation, entering into force in 2028, would merge several external action instruments. These include enlargement instruments such as IPA III, the Ukraine Facility, and the Reform and Growth Facilities for the Western Balkans and Moldova. Increasingly, the EU has moved from a model of financial assistance to one of investment for the enlargement countries, in the image of NGEU. This trend is set to continue in the next MFF, with a key component of the budget expected to be investment. In a May 2025 resolution, the European Parliament set out its priorities for the next MFF, proposing separate budget lines within Global Europe for the different pillars and instruments, along with dedicated pre‑enlargement allocations for each candidate country.
Main references
- Fernandes, M. and Saulnier, J., Towards renewed and beneficial EU enlargement, EPRS, European Parliament, March 2025.
- Leclerc, G. and Stanicek B., EU–Western Balkans relations: Macroeconomic situation and EU financial support, EPRS, European Parliament, 2024.
- OECD, Economic Convergence Scoreboard for the Western Balkans, OECD Publishing, 2025.
- Rubio, E., Alcidi, C., Hansum, R., Akhvlediani, T., Begg, I. et al., Adapting the EU budget to make it fit for purpose of future enlargements, Policy Department for External Relations, European Parliament, January 2025.
- Zeneli, V., Grieveson, R., Ioannides, I. and Bechev, D., The European Union Growth Plan for the Western Balkans: A reality test for EU enlargement, Atlantic Council, 2025.
Endnotes
Classification
Policy areas: Foreign Affairs | European Added Value
Committees: Foreign Affairs (AFET)
Disclaimer
This document is prepared for, and addressed to, the Members and staff of the European Parliament as background material to assist them in their parliamentary work. The content of the document is the sole responsibility of its author(s) and any opinions expressed herein should not be taken to represent an official position of the Parliament.
