Simplification of energy and tyre labelling legislation
Key findings
Overall, the IA provides a generally clear and structured assessment, drawing on implementation reports, stakeholder input, the European Product Registry for Energy Labelling (EPREL) and market surveillance data, JRC evidence and other sources. It identifies the main problems and drivers, provides relatively detailed estimates of administrative costs and savings, and discusses the economic, environmental and social impacts of the individual measures. The consultation annex reports stakeholder positions in detail, and the IA includes an SME test, a competitiveness check and a monitoring framework.
Nevertheless, the IA does not sufficiently explain the main policy trade‑offs underlying the initiative. It does not systematically assess how simplification and burden reduction may affect the effectiveness of the labelling framework in enabling consumers to make informed choices. This limits decision‑makers' understanding of the balance between administrative savings, digitalisation, enforcement and consumer protection. The specific objectives are neither measurable nor accompanied by time‑bound milestones. The limited differentiation between the two policy options reduces the scope for comparing alternative approaches or assessing whether individual measures could have been designed differently. Several alternatives, supported by stakeholders, involving substantive trade‑offs were discarded at an early stage. Evidence on consumer behaviour remains limited, despite consumers being central to the legislation's objectives. Behavioural assumptions are not tested, impacts on vulnerable or digitally excluded consumers are not systematically differentiated and several effects on consumer choice remain qualitative. Stakeholder consultation was largely business‑oriented, with limited input from citizens, consumers or SMEs, making it difficult to assess whether SME views and impacts differ from those of larger firms. The competitiveness check is particularly thin. The IA estimates administrative savings; however, some of the largest rely on assumptions for which limited evidence is provided. Moreover, the absence of a systematic sensitivity analysis makes it difficult to assess how robust these estimates are. The RSB issued a non‑qualified opinion under the specific scrutiny arrangements for omnibus initiatives. Finally, the proposal largely follows the preferred option, with the notable exception of the measure requiring online marketplaces to verify product registration in EPREL before allowing them to be offered for sale, which does not appear in the proposal's provisions.
Purpose statement
This briefing provides an initial analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the European Commission's impact assessment (IA) accompanying the proposal amending the Energy Labelling Regulation (ELR, Regulation (EU) 2017/1369) on simplification and better use of digital options and the Tyre Labelling Regulation (TLR, Regulation (EU) 2020/740) on the labelling of tyres. The briefing, prepared for the Committee on Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE), analyses whether the principal criteria laid down in the Commission's own Better Regulation Guidelines, as well as additional factors identified by the Parliament in its Impact Assessment Handbook, appear to be met by the IA. It does not attempt to deal with the substance of the proposal.
Background
The 2024 Draghi report on EU competitiveness identified market surveillance and poor enforcement (and potential non‑compliance) as major shortcomings in the implementation of EU ecodesign and energy labelling frameworks. Against this background, the Commission's 2025 action plan for affordable energy highlighted the contribution of energy efficient products to lowering energy bills for households, while noting that non‑compliance reduces these benefits, and announced an update of EU energy labelling and ecodesign rules. The Commission subsequently included an omnibus to simplify the energy product legislation in the 2026 Commission work programme. The resulting initiative includes targeted amendments to the ELR and the TLR.
Problem definition
Drawing on the two implementation reports accompanying this proposal and the stakeholder consultations, the IA identifies two problems (Ps). The first problem (P1) points to the disproportionate obligations for suppliers and dealers. While the ΙΑ provides an extensive description of the relevant obligations and some quantitative evidence for individual drivers (Ds), it does not include a consolidated assessment of the overall scale of the problem or a demonstration of the extent to which the existing obligations are disproportionate relative to their benefits.
According to the IA, the first driver (D1) concerns the cumulative transmission and registration requirements in the EPREL database. Under the ELR, suppliers must send dealers printed labels for each individual unit1 sold in the EU and at the same time register the information generating the labels in the EPREL database. Therefore, the current framework entails some overlap between the requirement to supply a physical label and the requirement to provide the information needed to generate the electronic label.
The second driver (D2) concerns the limitations of the current framework (ELR and TLR) to accommodate differences between products, distribution chains and technologies. The IA argues that current rules are best suited to white goods (washing machines, washer‑dryers, refrigerators, freezers and dishwashers) and to direct supplier/dealer‑customer relationships. For example, the ELR does not currently allow a label to be affixed or a QR code to be marked directly on the product. The IA illustrates this lack of flexibility across product groups by referring to factors such as the share of online sales, the role of intermediaries in distribution chains, the structure of import channels operating either through authorised EU subsidiaries or independent importers, the different product sizes and display patterns, and the extent to which customers use the label information when making purchase decisions. For the TLR, an additional issue is the misalignment with the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) requirements, owing to the limited powers the Commission has to update technical specifications. The IA also points to insufficient guidance to Member State authorities (MSAs) on testing, and a lack of information to support meaningful searches in EPREL or enable customers and non‑experts to identify the appropriate tyre.
The third driver (D3) points to the transitional provisions governing the shift from non‑rescaled to rescaled labels.2 Under the current framework, during the four‑month transitional period preceding the transition date, suppliers may be required to supply both labels in printed format and encode in EPREL two separate registrations, including models they already know will be discontinued. Dealers are required to replace a product label within 14 working days after the transition date, including models the supplier intends to stop selling, and may not display the rescaled label before that date.
The last driver (D4) refers to the incomplete application of the once‑only principle to information registered in EPREL. According to the IA, manufacturers had raised concerns about potential duplication between EPREL registration and the registry for digital product passports (DPP) under the Ecodesign for Sustainable Products Regulation (ESPR). However, the IA acknowledges that this is currently a prospective rather than an observed problem, as DPPs have not yet been introduced. A more immediate issue arises where information already registered in EPREL is requested again by national authorities for energy‑related incentive schemes. The IA cites examples from Germany and Poland, but does not establish the frequency or overall scale of this additional administrative burden.
The second problem (P2) is framed as the consistent non‑compliance with the energy labelling obligations and insufficient levels of enforcement. Compared to P1, the IA provides more extensive empirical evidence, drawing on European projects (such as EEPLIANT3), in‑depth testing results in Member States and inspection results registered in the ICSMS3 data and testing exercises. However, the available evidence is predominantly based on targeted or risk‑based inspections without providing a representative estimate of overall non‑compliance in the EU market. Accordingly, while recognising that a precise estimate cannot be derived from the available evidence, the IA considers that the rate could lie towards the upper end of the Commission's earlier estimate of 10 to 25 %.4
For P2, the IA identifies several root causes, notably insufficient enforcement, a lack of dissuasive measures against false declarations, limited knowledge among economic operators, complex legislation and the growth of online sales. It states that most of these drivers fall outside the initiative's scope and therefore concentrates on the ambiguous illegal concepts identified in three areas: unclear responsibilities of intermediary actors, diverging obligations of online marketplaces and search engines on label display compared to physical shops, and, regarding the TLR, a lack of specification for using simplified and nested label displays.
Overall, the underlying drivers of the two problems identified are generally supported by evidence, including implementation reports, stakeholder input and market surveillance data. The IA also includes a problem tree (IA, p. 8) which helps the reader understand the problem structure. However, while the nature of the problems is well described, their scale and relative importance are only partially established. This is particularly relevant for P1, which is framed in terms of disproportionate obligations, without providing the necessary evidence to demonstrate this. Finally, the IA includes a short qualitative discussion of how problems may persist in the absence of legislative action, and refers to relevant market and regulatory developments. However, it does not systematically assess how these developments could affect the magnitude of the identified problems over time.
Subsidiarity/proportionality
The legal bases for the proposal are Articles 114 and 194 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union concerning, respectively, internal market harmonisation and energy objectives. The IA addresses both the dimensions of necessity and EU added value. On necessity, the IA justifies EU action by drawing on the cross‑border character of the EU internal market for energy‑related products, while on EU added value, it states that action at EU level could not be replicated by Member States acting alone.
The principle of proportionality is briefly addressed in the proposal, which states that the targeted amendments are evidence‑based and do not go beyond what is necessary to maintain a level playing field, ensure uniform compliance and align the legislative framework with technological developments. The latter is asserted in the explanatory memorandum and executive summary, rather than supported by a distinct proportionality analysis in the main IA.
The IA is not accompanied by a subsidiarity grid. The subsidiarity deadline for national parliaments is recorded as 27 October 2026. On 23 September 2026, the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) issued an opinion, without, however, raising any subsidiarity‑related issues.
Objectives of the initiative
The stated general objective is to 'simplify the ELR and TLR whilst preserving the objective of providing relevant information to allow consumers to choose more efficient products and reduce energy consumption'. The two specific objectives are therefore purely revision‑specific: simplify rules for suppliers/retailers and improve compliance through clarification and digital options.
The IA devotes only a few lines to the objectives, stating them without further contextual explanation or explicitly setting out how the problems and their underlying drivers translate into the objectives and subsequently into the policy options.
The Better Regulation toolbox (tool#15) states that objectives should link problems and their drivers to policy options, and that regulatory fitness (REFIT) revisions of existing legislation should aim to simplify and eliminate unnecessary regulatory burdens, while achieving the underlying policy objectives. This is particularly relevant for a simplification initiative. While the proposal states that it does not change the scope and objectives of the labelling framework (IA, p. 24), the IA does not explain how the revision‑specific objectives interact with the underlying policy objectives of the two regulations. A clearer articulation of this relationship would have facilitated the assessment of whether the proposed simplification could be achieved without undermining the effectiveness of the labelling framework and, importantly, would have made potential trade‑offs between simplification and policy effectiveness more transparent for decision‑makers.
The two specific objectives are not accompanied by target values or time‑bound milestones, nor does the proposal update the one‑off evaluation provisions of the two regulations. Therefore, the objectives do not fulfil the SMART criteria.5 Moreover, no option‑specific operational objectives are presented for the preferred option in the monitoring and evaluation section, as recommended in the Better Regulation toolbox (tool#15).
Finally, this section could have benefited from a more explicit intervention logic linking the identified problems and drivers to the specific objectives and individual policy measures/options, thereby improving the traceability of the intervention logic.
The IA reports alignment with the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), namely SDG 7 (affordable and clean energy), SDG 8 (decent work and economic growth) and SDG 13 (Climate action).
| Objectives | General |
|---|---|
| General | Simplify the ELR and TLR whilst preserving the objective of providing information to allow customers to make informed decisions |
| Specific#1 | Simplifying rules for suppliers and retailers |
| Specific#2 | Improving compliance through more clarity and use of digital options |
Range of options considered
The IA defines a qualitative baseline scenario and assesses two policy options. The baseline assumes that the current framework will remain unchanged, and existing non‑legislative measures, such as plausibility checks in EPREL and EU‑funded implementation actions, will continue. However, the baseline does not specify which relevant EU‑level policies, measures or pending Commission proposals are incorporated, nor does it establish an explicit time horizon. This limits the transparency of the dynamic baseline against which the options are assessed (IA, p. 25).
The IA presents only two, nearly identical, policy options, with policy option 2 (PO2) differing from policy option 1 (PO1) in just two additional TLR measures of relatively limited scope. PO1 contains 10 measures for the ELR and 3 for the TLR, whereas PO2 takes all the measures in PO1 and adds two extra TLR ones: measure 13 (M13) on new information requirements in EPREL and measure 14 (M14) on the direct inclusion of simplified and nested tyre‑label display in the annex to the TLR (M14).
The range of retained options is therefore relatively narrow, providing limited scope for comparing materially different policy approaches or for bringing out the main policy trade‑offs. The Better Regulation toolbox (tool#16) recommends that major policy options supported by stakeholders should, in principle, be included among the options considered, and that the reasons for discarding stakeholder‑supported options should be clearly explained. In this respect, there appears to have been scope to assess alternative policy designs reflecting stakeholder feedback. For example, in response to the comparatively poorer compliance of online sales, measure 7 introduces an obligation for online marketplaces to verify product registration in EPREL before the product is placed on the market. The IA includes the same measure under both policy options but does not assess the stronger approach, supported by several stakeholders, of assigning greater responsibility to online marketplaces in certain cases. Instead, it discarded this approach at an early stage, citing incoherence with the general framework of the Digital Services Act and additional burdens for platforms with broad product portfolios, without, however, estimating the scale of those additional costs or obligations. Likewise, measure 15, mandating the complete removal of tyre labelling obligations for vehicle dealers, has been included in both policy options despite dealers' support for allowing a smaller or simplified label in vehicle offers. Such alternatives could have made the trade‑off more explicit between administrative savings for vehicle dealers on the one hand, and the underlying objective to sufficiently inform customers on tyre performance on the other.
Overall, the correspondence between the identified problem drivers and the individual policy measures is not always explicit. A clearer mapping of drivers, objectives and measures would have helped the reader understand how each retained measure is expected to address the identified problems. More generally, the narrow range and nested design of the policy options limit the space for comparison and decision‑making. As PO2 consists of PO1 plus two additional TLR measures, the comparative analysis can test the added value of those two measures, but not whether the measures common to both options should be retained, excluded or designed differently. In practice, these measures are largely taken as a given in the comparison, rather than being tested against alternative policy configurations.
As mentioned before, the IA discusses and discards at an early stage the following measures: direct amendment of product‑specific delegated acts, establishment of fully digital label for delivery by suppliers, reinforced responsibilities for online marketplaces and repeal of the TLR with possible future integration into an ESPR measure. The IA explains that these measures were discarded on the grounds of time and technical feasibility, legal and regulatory coherence, potential shifts in compliance costs, consumer accessibility concerns and the maturity of alternative regulatory frameworks. However, measures that received at least partial support from stakeholders could have been included in the assessment, especially those reflecting substantive trade‑offs. For example, the 'establishment of 'digital‑only labels' reflects a trade‑off between simplification and digitalisation and accessibility, effectiveness and compliance costs. The inclusion of this measure in one of the retained policy options could therefore have enabled a more explicit assessment of this trade‑off (IA, pp. 28‑30).
Assessment of impacts
The IA assesses the economic, environmental and social impacts of the policy options.
The analysis on economic impacts focuses mainly on changes in administrative costs, while wider economic effects, notably on competition and compliance, remain largely unquantified. According to the IA, both options will result in 'substantial' savings, although it does not provide the overall baseline administrative burden against which the relative magnitude of these savings could be assessed. Under policy option 1, the summary table reports up to €66 million in one‑off savings and €131.7 million in recurrent annual savings, against one‑off costs of €16 million and recurrent costs of up to €9 million. Policy option 2 differs mainly through higher one‑off costs for tyre suppliers (net savings in one‑off costs are reduced to €41 million).
The IA presents an extensive analysis of the changes on costs and resulting net savings, distinguishing between one‑off and recurrent impacts and between the main stakeholder groups. The estimates are based on unit costs, time requirements and the number of affected entities or transactions. However, the robustness and traceability of the resulting estimates are weakened by several assumptions not supported by evidence in the IA. This is particularly relevant for some of the largest estimated benefits. The annual savings under M1 of up to €83 million depend on future delegated acts; the €40 million annual savings under M15 rely on assumptions concerning IT maintenance costs and staff time saved by car dealers; and the €66 million one‑off savings under M8 assume one hour of avoided work per EPREL registration, and depend on the eventual overlap between EPREL and DPP information requirements. Other estimates also rely on unsubstantiated assumptions. These include, for example, the assumed average order size of 20 units (M1), the assumptions underlying the 7.5‑hour savings per interaction with authorised representatives (M6), the 1 000 document checks and the 50 to 100 laboratory tests avoided per year (M12). Finally, there are inconsistencies in some data. For example, the one‑off cost of M13 is estimated at €6 million in the narrative (IA, p. 41) but at €9.5 million in the main summary table (IA, p. 42).
The distribution of costs and benefits across different economic operators presents a more nuanced picture. Although suppliers are expected to benefit from the largest estimated savings (up to €85 million per year), retailers are estimated to incur around €7 million in additional annual printing costs (M1), partly offset by annual savings of around €3 million whenever a label transition occurs (M5). Online marketplaces may incur up to €2 million in additional verification costs (M7). At the same time, car dealers are estimated to benefit from considerable savings under M15 of around €40 million per year.
The IA briefly assesses the options' environmental impact. It estimates that the current obligation to provide printed labels generates around 429 tonnes of non‑recyclable backing liner and 1.5 tonnes of printing ink. However, it recognises that savings from removing the printed label obligation (M1) cannot be estimated, because the amount of products for which printed labels would cease to be supplied will depend on future product‑specific delegated acts. Likewise, while anticipating reduced waste from extending the period during which products bearing non‑rescaled label can be sold (M5), it does not quantify this effect because there is no available information on the treatment of unsold stock. Moreover, possible energy and emission effects arising from changes in label visibility, consumer behaviour, compliance and the improved use of EPREL for tyre selection, remain qualitative. Overall, while the assessment identifies the principal causal chains, it remains weak in substantiating their scale and quantifying the trade‑off between simplification and consumers' ability to identify and purchase more efficient products.
The IA includes a short discussion on social impacts for all measures in policy options 1 and 2. However, the analysis focuses almost exclusively on consumers' access to and understanding of labels, rather than examining the broader social effects that could be relevant, such as digital exclusion, accessibility, health and road safety, and impacts on vulnerable consumers. Behavioural assumptions are not tested, such as the impact on consumers of having both rescaled and non‑rescaled labels for a 12‑month period (M4, M5). Similarly, although measures intended to strengthen compliance are assumed to benefit consumers, the link between the regulatory output and the expected outcome is not explored. Finally, the analysis does not systematically differentiate impacts across consumer groups, including vulnerable or digitally excluded consumers. Overall, the assessment indicates the likely direction of certain effects, but it does not estimate their magnitude, likelihood or distribution.
The IA does not specifically consider the initiative's possible implications for fundamental rights. This would be warranted given the shift by certain actors towards offering information on products digitally and the potentially varying impacts of this on vulnerable consumers, such as older persons and persons with disabilities. The IA acknowledges a need for consumer testing regarding the shift towards the provision or display of digital labels, but does not assess whether this shift could result in discriminatory practices in terms of access to the information. This could have been considered in light of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights' provisions on non‑discrimination, including on grounds of age (Article 21), the rights of the elderly (Article 25) and consumer protection (Article 38). The proposal nevertheless states, without further substantiation, that it has 'no adverse impact on fundamental rights'.
The IA compares the two policy options against the criteria of effectiveness, efficiency and coherence, assigning equal weight to each criterion and to the two specific objectives. It considers that PO2 scores more highly on effectiveness, because the full technical specifications for the simplified and nested display of tyre labels would become applicable when the amendments enter into force, whereas under PO1, technical specifications would only be established subsequently through a delegated act. In terms of efficiency, PO1 scores somewhat better than PO2 because, under PO2, tyre suppliers incur additional one‑off administrative costs associated with the additional information parameters to be entered in the public part of EPREL. However, it notes that other benefits, including improved compliance, competition and usability of EPREL, could not be monetised. As regards coherence, the IA considers that PO2 performs better. While both options improve internal coherence by aligning the TLR empowerment to update technical parameters via delegated acts with the approach used under the ELR (M11), PO2 directly incorporates the technical specifications for simplified tyre‑label display and additional EPREL information requirements. The IA also considers PO2 more externally coherent, because directly amending the TLR would reduce the risk of a later delegated act revision overlapping with planned tyre‑specific provisions under the ESPR. On this basis, the IA identifies PO2 as the preferred option.
| Option | Economic impacts | Social impacts | Environmental impacts | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| One‑off cost
savings (€Μ) | Recurrent cost
savings (€Μ) |
|||
| PO1 | 50.0 | 122.7 | Not quantified/ monetised | Not quantified/ monetised |
| PO2 (preferred) | 40.5 | 122.7 | Not quantified/ monetised | Not quantified/ monetised |
| Breakdown of economic impacts – PO2 (preferred) | ||||
| Suppliers | 40.5 | 85 | ||
| Dealers | 34 | |||
| MSAs | 3.7 | |||
| Commission | Costs not quantified | |||
SMEs/Competitiveness
The initiative is considered SME‑relevant and included in the SME filter. The IA evaluates the impacts on small and medium‑sized enterprises (SMEs) constructed around the four steps of the SME test defined in the Better Regulation toolbox (tool#23). In the first step, the IA identifies SMEs as being directly affected in the manufacturing, retail and wholesale sectors but does not estimate the overall number of SMEs concerned. For retail and wholesale, it uses SME employment shares as proxies, indicating that SMEs account for slightly less than two thirds of employment in retail and 75 % in wholesale. For manufacturing, it considers Eurostat statistics insufficiently granular for product‑specific estimates.
In terms of consultation, it appears that SME input is very limited, and the evidence on the extent to which SMEs' views are different from those of large business is very weak. Regarding the assessment of impacts, direct costs (and cost savings) for SME suppliers cannot be quantified because their share is unknown. For retailers, the IA assumes that SMEs bear two thirds of the estimated €7 million annual recurrent printing costs based on their employment share. Finally, in terms of the measures considered to minimise disproportionate negative impacts on SMEs, the IA mentions the retailers' right to request printed labels from suppliers, which has been maintained. Finally, in relation to the Commission's 35 % SME burden reduction target, the IA does not quantify the SME share of the identified administrative cost savings.
A brief and largely descriptive competitiveness check is provided in Annex 4 (p. 75). It covers the four dimensions of the Commission's competitiveness check: cost and price competitiveness, international competitiveness, capacity to innovate and SME competitiveness. The IA assesses the impact on cost and price competitiveness as positive, owing to the reduced compliance cost for suppliers and retailers. International competitiveness of EU‑based SME suppliers and retailers is also assessed as positive, mainly due to the measures on the clarification of authorised representatives' responsibilities and stronger compliance for tyre retailers, which is expected to affect more low‑cost importers than EU manufacturers. Finally, the annex provides no explanation for the neutral assessment of the capacity to innovate and SME competitiveness.
Overall, the analysis under the competitiveness check is particularly thin, as it fails to provide sector‑level indicators, benchmarks against non‑EU competitors or any other quantitative evidence beyond the compliance‑cost estimates (tool#21).
Simplification, burden reduction and other regulatory implications
The IA states that the preferred option is in line with the REFIT objectives of simplification and reduction of red tape, as it seeks to reduce compliance costs for suppliers and retailers, increase the benefits derived from the EPREL database and improve the effectiveness of MSAs. It also assesses the preferred option against the 'one in, one out' principle, estimating net annualised administrative savings for businesses of up to €123 million over a 10‑year period (IA, p. 73). The proposal reiterates the REFIT rationale, and estimates annual administrative cost savings of up to €125 million (€2 million more because of unstated 'slight adjustment in the measures proposed'), alongside €11.5 million in additional costs arising from new obligations.
Monitoring and evaluation
The IA identifies a range of existing or potential sources for monitoring the initiative, including EPREL and ICSMS data, national market surveillance checks, a four‑year benchmarking report, surveys, helpdesk requests, the EEPLIANT4 project and a possible repetition of the EU compliance sweep of online shops.
It suggests two indicators for monitoring the specific objective on the simplification of rules and five indicators for monitoring the specific objective on improving compliance. However, these are presented without corresponding baselines, targets or specified measurement frequencies.
The Better Regulation toolbox (tool#43) advises that indicators should be relevant to the objectives, and accepted, credible, unambiguous and easy to interpret. However, the absence of operational objectives or a clear link between the proposed indicators and the concrete outputs expected from the preferred option makes it difficult to assess their relevance. Moreover, some of the proposed indicators do not appear fully unambiguous. For example, the number of ICSMS entries per Member State and the number of questions received in EPREL helpdesk may have different interpretations and reflect changes in compliance or regulatory clarity – but, equally, changes in enforcement activity or awareness.
Moreover, no specific indicator appears to monitor whether simplification preserves consumers' ability to make informed choices, even though this is part of the general objective and the IA itself recognises a potential trade‑off between reducing label provision and maintaining informed consumer choice.
Finally, the IA does not specify a timetable for overall evaluation of the amendments, while the proposal states that specific monitoring, evaluation and reporting arrangements are 'not applicable' (proposal, p. 9).
Stakeholder consultation
The IA summarises the stakeholder consultation activities in Annex 2 (pp. 49‑71), covering a period from April 2025 to March 2026. However, consultation specifically addressing the simplification initiative was relatively concentrated – from October 2025 to March 2026. In addition to the surveys conducted in support of the ELR and TLR implementation reports, the consultation activities comprised an implementation dialogue in October 2025, a reality check in December 2025, 10 written contributions submitted following the reality check and a call for evidence (CfE) published on the Have your say portal from 12 February to 12 March 2026. The IA does not explain why a dedicated public consultation was not conducted. This is noteworthy given that the activities specifically addressing the simplification measures were relatively business‑oriented and that several measures, such as changes to the provision of printed labels and the removal of tyre‑labelling obligations for vehicle dealers, have direct implications for consumers.6 According to the IA, many CfE participants also took part in the reality check, implying a relatively narrow breadth of consultation pool (IA, p. 67).
Annex 2 provides extensive information on the consultations, and, in many cases, a granular account of individual contributors' positions. It also identifies differences between stakeholder groups in some specific measures. While findings are reported transparently and stakeholders' views are quite detailed, the IA does not provide an overarching synthesis of the findings from the various consultation activities, nor does it systematically relate stakeholders' positions to the individual retained policy measures, the policy options or the preferred option as a whole. As a result, it is difficult to obtain a clear overall picture of the degree of support for the preferred approach or the main areas of agreement or disagreement between stakeholder groups. Although stakeholder evidence is referred to at several points in the problem definition and in the discussion of discarded measures, its contribution to the assessment of impacts and comparison of options is less evident.
While the initiative is considered SME‑relevant, direct SME participation in the consultation appears limited. The SME test refers principally to the participation of one representative of SME United in the implementation dialogue (p. 77). The IA states that SMEs' views do not differ from those of large enterprises, but does not provide the evidence to substantiate this conclusion. Finally, the limited SME input did not allow a disaggregation of findings between micro, small and medium‑sized enterprises. This limits the extent to which differences in the effects and views of firms of different sizes can be identified, particularly in the retail sector, where SMEs account for a substantial share of employment.
Supporting data and analytical methods used
The IA includes a short section in Annex 1 on 'Evidence, sources and quality' (p. 47). The analytical work for the IA was carried out in‑house and draws largely on the Commission's implementation reports on the ELR and TLR, adopted alongside the proposal.7 The IA also draws on stakeholder consultation, EPREL statistics, market surveillance and ICSMS data, two surveys, JRC evidence, commercial data and industry reports. The IA does not identify a dedicated external support study or evaluation commissioned specifically, although some of the underlying evidence was produced externally. It also cites reports and analysis from the ongoing EEPLIANT concerted action and refers the reader to Annex 7, although the IA contains only six annexes. Some of this evidence cannot therefore be independently scrutinised. (IA, pp. 25, 47)
The analytical work focuses on changes in administrative and other economic effects. Costs and savings are quantified for many individual measures, whereas the social and environmental effects are assessed mainly qualitatively. The IA itself acknowledges that indirect economic effects relating to, for example, competition and improved compliance could not be quantified or monetised (IA, pp. 30‑43).
Data limitations and assumptions are frequently acknowledged. For example, regarding non‑compliance with the ELR, the IA notes that compliance checks rarely establish whether non‑compliance is intentional or results from lack of awareness (IA, p. 16). However, the evidence supporting the individual assumptions is uneven and, in several instances, does not allow their plausibility to be assessed. The calculation of administrative costs appears to broadly follow the standard cost model‑type logic, combining affected populations, frequency or time requirements, and labour or unit costs. However, calculations and assumptions are dispersed across the assessment of individual measures and documented in varying levels of detail. Some estimates can be reconstructed easily, while others depend on assumptions for which limited evidence is provided.8
Better Regulation tool#65 recommends recognising uncertainty explicitly, quantifying it where possible and examining the influence of key assumptions on the results. The IA addresses uncertainty mainly through qualitative acknowledgements of data gaps and provides ranges for some individual parameters. However, it does not conduct a systematic sensitivity analysis to assess how alternative assumptions affect the cost and savings estimates. Such analysis would have been particularly relevant for assumptions concerning, for example, the average order size under M1, the time savings associated with interactions with authorised representatives under M6, the number of document checks and laboratory tests avoided under M12, and the IT maintenance and staff time savings attributed to M15. This limits the ability to assess the robustness of the estimated savings and creates a risk of false precision around results that depend on uncertain assumptions.
Burden reduction and the 'one in, one out' approach are addressed in the main report and the SME check in Annex 5. The SME check identifies qualitative benefits and notes that SMEs may face proportionally higher labelling and EPREL‑related costs because of lower economies of scale and less developed IT systems. However, it does not quantify the SME share of identified savings that contribute to the Commission's 35 % burden reduction target (IA, p. 79). For the 'one in, one out' calculation, the IA reports up to €123 million of net annual savings over a 10‑year period (IA, p. 44).
Finally, the IA takes into account some forward‑looking developments, including the expansion of online sales, changes in distribution channels and growing imports from outside the EU, and the future interaction between EPREL and the digital product passport (IA, p. 11). However, it does not develop alternative future scenarios or systematically stress‑test the proposed measures against the trends identified. This is relevant considering the Better Regulation toolbox (tool#20), which encourages the consideration of megatrends and long‑term resilience of policy options.
Follow‑up to Commission Regulatory Scrutiny Board opinion
Annex 1 reports that, at an upstream meeting with the Commission's services on 11 March 2026, the Regulatory Scrutiny Board (RSB) stressed the need for the IA to highlight the trade‑offs and distributional effects, provide transparency on new administrative obligations, clarify the continued validity of the existing framework's policy objectives and substantiate the outcome of stakeholder input.
Following its scrutiny on 20 May 2026, the RSB issued an opinion without qualification, based on the specific scrutiny arrangements applicable to this omnibus initiative.9 In its opinion, the Board identified several shortcomings. It also recommended that the lead service further develop the analysis on non‑compliance with label obligations (P2), strengthen the assessment of social impacts, particularly as regards consumers' behaviour and ability to make informed decisions, and more clearly differentiate and compare the two policy options. It also requested greater transparency on data gaps and on the assumptions underpinning the individual measure assessment.
According to Annex 1, the final IA was revised in response to these comments. It introduced additional evidence to the non‑compliance analysis, added an assessment of social impacts for individual measures and strengthened the rationale and comparison for the two policy options. However, as the draft IA submitted to the RSB is not publicly available, the extent of these revisions cannot be identified. The final IA nevertheless appears to address some of the RSB's concerns, albeit only partially. As discussed above, significant uncertainties remain regarding the scale and causes of non‑compliance, while the potential effects on consumers remain largely qualitative. The comments on the social and consumer impacts of M3, M4 and M5, particularly on consumers' ability to make informed choices, are only partially addressed. Moreover, the differentiation between the two policy options remains limited, as most measures are common to both options. The IA does not clearly demonstrate the trade‑off between regulatory simplification and maintaining the effectiveness of the framework in enabling consumers to make informed purchasing choices.
Coherence between the Commission's legislative proposal and IA
The proposal broadly follows the preferred policy option identified in the IA (PO2). Of PO2's 15 measures, most are reflected in the proposal, although some have been adjusted during legislative drafting. A notable exception concerns the obligation for online marketplaces to verify a product's registration in EPREL before allowing it to be offered for sale (M7). The measure was included in both policy options, including the preferred option, and its economic and social impacts were assessed in the IA. However, it does not appear to be included in the proposal's provisions. This omission is particularly noteworthy because the proposal's legislative financial and digital statement still refers to this obligation (proposal, pp. 52‑53). Moreover, it is unclear whether the proposal has updated its cost estimates to reflect the omission of M7 (proposal, p. 9).
Endnotes
Classification
Policy areas: Ex-ante Impact Assessment | Energy
Regions: European Union
Committees: Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE)
Statement on the use of AI
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Disclaimer
This document is prepared for, and addressed to, the Members and staff of the European Parliament as background material to assist them in their parliamentary work. The content of the document is the sole responsibility of its author(s) and any opinions expressed herein should not be taken to represent an official position of the Parliament.
