Strengthening Europol: A revision
Key findings
The impact assessment (IA) underpins the revision of the Europol Regulation – part of the law enforcement and judicial cooperation package which the Commission published on 24 June 2026. Drawing on various data sources, the IA identifies two distinct but interrelated problems and their drivers. The need for EU action is sufficiently justified and subsidiarity is adequately addressed; however, proportionality is only partially examined. It presents the initiative's general, specific and operational objectives linked to performance indicators. Overall, the objectives broadly meet the S.M.A.R.T. criteria (specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time‑bound), although some shortcomings remain regarding their specificity and measurability. The IA identifies two policy options, each comprising measures to address the initiative's specific objectives. However, their design and description, as well as the selection of the preferred option, raise questions regarding alternative options, links to the identified problems and consideration of stakeholder views. The IA considers – qualitatively and quantitatively – economic, social, and environmental impacts, being transparent about limitations and assumptions. While the assessment appears to be largely comprehensive and transparent, the analysis and evidence are presented in a rather fragmented manner, while the IA does not sufficiently consider fundamental rights impacts or potential implications at the regional or local level. The IA does not provide a solid monitoring framework and the timeline for the evaluation is unclear. Efforts have been made to address the Regulatory Scrutiny Board recommendations, although some weaknesses remain, such as the analysis of fundamental right impacts and the need to strengthen the monitoring and evaluation framework. Finally, the proposal appears to be largely in line with the IA's preferred policy option, despite a few remaining discrepancies, such as the introduction of a change at governance level which was not analysed in the IA.
Purpose statement
This briefing provides an initial analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of the European Commission's impact assessment (IA) accompanying the proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol), amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1726 and Regulation (EU) 2024/982, and repealing Regulation (EU) 2016/794. The briefing, prepared for the Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE) Committee, analyses whether the principal criteria laid down in the Commission's own Better Regulation Guidelines, as well as additional factors identified by the Parliament in its Impact Assessment Handbook, appear to be met by the IA. It does not attempt to deal with the substance of the proposal.
Background
Criminal networks, terrorists and hostile actors operate through increasingly sophisticated, flexible and interconnected cross‑border ecosystems, leveraging digital infrastructures, illicit financial flows, logistical networks and online services, including artificial intelligence. In its 2025 European Union Serious and Organised Crime Threat Assessment (EU‑SOCTA) report, Europol highlights that serious and organised crime remains one of the greatest security threats.1 The European Commission has taken several steps to address the situation , including by strengthening the role of Europol. The EU regulatory framework on law enforcement cooperation has been significantly expanded in the past decade. As part of these developments, the Commission also took steps to assess the impact of the existing legal framework. In accordance with Article 68(3) of the Europol Regulation, the Commission prepared a report in 2025 to evaluate and assess the operational impact of the implementation of the tasks provided for in Regulation (EU) 2022/991. The evaluation report is accompanied by a Commission staff working document.2 The Commission conducted a back‑to‑back evaluation together with an impact assessment, both supported by an external study.3 The findings show that, although 'Europol has become a central pillar of a more integrated and operational European security architecture' (IA, executive summary, p. 1), the agency's ability to provide timely, comprehensive, and actionable support to Member States is constrained by legal, operational, and structural factors. As part of the recently adopted package to strengthen the EU's response to an evolving criminal landscape, the Commission proposed a regulation to reinforce Europol's role as an information hub for law enforcement and strengthen its capacity to support law enforcement operational action.4 This is in line with the Commission's 2025 ProtectEU internal security strategy to reinforce EU agencies and bodies for greater internal security and the 2024‑2029 political guidelines aimed at making Europol a truly operational police agency. The initiative to propose new rules revising the Europol Regulation was also included in the 2026 Commission work programme.
In November 2025, the European Parliament adopted a legislative resolution on the Commission's proposal to enhance police cooperation to prevent, detect and investigate migrant smuggling and trafficking in human beings. The Council conclusions of 13 June 2025 called on the Commission to increase the financial support allocated to the European Multidisciplinary Platform Against Criminal Threats (EMPACT), including in the Europol budget.
Problem definition
The IA starts by describing the initiative's political and legal context. The IA underlines that rapid technological advances are accelerating the emergence and evolution of threats, increasing the scale, pace, and sophistication of the challenges Europol is required to address within its current framework.
Drawing on the 2025 report, the study supporting the evaluation and the impact assessment, and other sources, the IA identifies two distinct but interrelated problems ('P's; IA, pp. 10‑15), which reduce 'Europol's operational effectiveness and its capacity to deliver its full added value' (IA, executive summary, p. 1).
P1: Europol and national authorities face persistent information gaps when investigating cross‑border crimes and identifying threats. The IA identifies gaps in the availability and quality of information at EU level, delaying the detection of organised crime structures and anticipation of emerging threats. Data contributions to Europol's main information systems and tools5 vary significantly.
P2: Europol's operational support is still limited and fragmented. The IA highlights challenges to cross‑border law enforcement cooperation both at EU and national level, including unevenly structured cooperation and limited information exchange between EU bodies and agencies.
The two problems are linked to a series of problem drivers ('D's; IA, pp. 15‑21):
Drivers linked to P1
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D1.1: Regulatory, legal and procedural constraints affecting information sharing – which remains uneven and incomplete due to divergent national criminal procedures, political sensitivities and varying levels of trust in Europol, among other things.
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D1.2: Operational and technical limitations in data automation, integration and standardisation hampering information exchange – including differences in national law enforcement IT systems in terms of automation, connectivity, and the ability to produce structured, interoperable data.
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D1.3: Regulatory, legal and procedural constraints affecting data processing – linked to compliance requirements related to data protection rules, in particular concerning data subject categorisation (DSC).
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D1.4: Structural and operational shift in the criminal data and information environment – with the digital transformation of crime and the increasing use of technologies, the speed, scale and complexity of criminal activity have increased, leading to changes in the nature and volume of information exchanged.
Drivers linked to P2
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D2.1: Limited awareness of Europol's operational support – which results in delayed engagement with Europol, and limits the timely exchange of information, the early identification of cross‑border links and, overall, the effective use of the agency's capabilities.
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D2.2: Operational and capacity‑related constraints limiting the tailoring of Europol's support to national investigative needs – where operational support provided by Europol is not always sufficiently tailored to the needs, legal frameworks and evidentiary standards of national investigations. At the same time, the agency has limited capacity to support technology‑enabled investigations.
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D2.3: Limited capacity for systemic modernisation of law enforcement capabilities – linked to organisational, legal and procurement constraints, having as a result that Europol's role in supporting innovation and specialised capabilities remains limited in scale.6
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D2.4: Regulatory, legal and operational constraints on information sharing between Europol and the European Public Prosecutor's Office (EPPO) – given that cooperation is mostly based on ad hoc requests and case‑by‑case arrangements. In addition, Member State consent is necessary to allow sharing of operational data (from Europol to the EPPO).
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D2.5: Weak information exchange and insufficiently institutionalised cooperation between Europol and other EU bodies and agencies – affecting the scope, foreseeability and sustainability of coordinated support that would benefit national authorities.7
The description of the problems and drivers are generally clear, detailed, and substantiated by data and evidence from various sources, including the Commission's activities in the preparation of the IA, desk research, and consultation of stakeholders (in line with Tool #13 of the Better Regulation Toolbox). The IA estimates that the problem would persist without further EU action (IA, pp. 20‑21). However, the IA tends to bring together different issues under a single problem or driver without adequately explaining the distinction between them. For example, there appears to be an overlap between D2.2 and D2.3, with both focusing on capacity constraints in Europol's operational support to Member States.
The IA, complemented by its Annex 3 (pp. 77‑78), identifies several key stakeholder groups affected by the initiative: EU citizens, national authorities (law enforcement officers, and IT organisations in Member States), and EU level actors (Europol, Eurojust, EPPO), describing the practical implication for them. However, the IA does not discuss: (i) regional and sub‑national law enforcement authorities;8 (ii) the role of non‑governmental and civil society organisations, as well as research organisations, in providing expert input, independent expertise and evidence, and supporting transparency and oversight activities; or (iii) the perspectives and involvement of private parties (including companies).
Subsidiary/proportionality
The EU has shared competence with Member States in the policy area of freedom, security and justice. The proposed legal basis for this initiative is Article 88 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), which established Europol's mission and empowers the European Parliament and the Council to 'determine Europol's structure, operation, field of action and tasks'.
With respect to the requirements of the Better Regulation Guidelines (BRG), the IA describes the necessity for and added value of EU action (IA, pp. 22‑23) in a brief but adequate manner. The IA explains that the scale, speed and cross‑border nature of criminal activity require a certain level of coordination. EU action is required to provide a common legal framework which will enable Europol to effectively support Member States, ensure the necessary level of cooperation and coordination, and improve the exchange and analysis of information.The initiative's EU added value lies in Europol's role as a central hub for information, operations and technology.
Although the IA includes a relatively small section on subsidiarity, it is accompanied by a subsidiarity grid, as recommended by the Task Force on subsidiarity, proportionality and 'doing less more efficiently', using the guidelines and template provided by the Better Regulation Toolbox (Tool #5 and Tool #11). Member States' national parliaments had until 9 November 2026 to express subsidiarity-related concerns. Several Member States (BG, HR, CZ, DK, FI, DE, IE, IT, LV, LT, LU, PL, RO, SE, SK) referred the proposal to their competent authorities for scrutiny, with LU and SK having completed their review. The Czech Senate issued a resolution and the German Bundesrat reached a decision on the file. The Italian Senate Committee on European Union Policies and the Bulgarian Committee on European Affairs and Oversight of the European Funds found that the proposal complies with the subsidiarity principle. The Committee on Justice of the Swedish Parliament likewise considered the draft proposal to comply with the principle of subsidiarity. The Czech Chamber of Deputies issued a reasoned opinion on 5 November 2026, as did the French Senate on the same day.
The IA does not include a distinct section on proportionality. It is discussed in the analysis of impacts of the policy options (IA, chapters 5 and 6, and Annexes 5 and 10), in section 3 of the subsidiarity grid and in the relevant section of the proposal's explanatory memorandum (COM(2026) 580, p. 9).
Objectives of the initiative
The general objective outlined in the IA is to improve the effectiveness of EU‑level law enforcement cooperation in preventing and combating serious and organised crime and terrorism, in order to contribute to a high level of internal security in the EU (IA, p. 23).
There are two specific objectives 9 ('SO's) addressing the problem drivers:
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SO1: reinforce Europol's role as an information hub for law enforcement to facilitate the systematic identification of cross‑border links between cases, individuals and criminal networks while ensuring robust data protection and fundamental rights safeguards.
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SO2: strengthen Europol's capacity to support law enforcement operational action to support faster, more coherent and effective investigations and ensure more continuous EU‑level assistance throughout the operational lifecycle, from intelligence gathering through to investigation and prosecution.
In line with the BRG recommendation, the IA defines operational objectives for each specific objective linked to relevant indicators (Annex 6). The operational objectives would be monitored through the indicators, using various data sources. Nevertheless, no clear distinction is made between the focus of the specific objectives presented in the IA (pp. 23‑24) and the 'operational objectives' set out in Annex 6, which appear to overlap.
The IA lacks a properly presented and well‑structured intervention logic, despite the Better Regulation Toolbox requirement (Tool #11). Although it includes Figure 1 to present its intervention logic (IA, p. 24), it does not capture the various elements (problem, drivers, specific objectives, policy options), nor explain the links among them.10 As a result, it is difficult to link the objectives to the policy options without the support of the study. The objectives do not fully meet the S.M.A.R.T. criteria (specific, measurable, achievable, relevant and time‑bound), as required by the Toolbox (Tool #15). More specifically, the indicators are loosely defined and lack a more detailed description, while a more precise approach to their measurability would facilitate consistent assessment and follow‑up (e.g. through the comparison of indicator results based on clear definitions and a predefined scoring scale).
The IA notes that 'as certain options involve the exchange of personal data, particular attention is given to fundamental rights, in line with the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights' (IA, Annex 10, p. 154); that is: Article 7 (respect for private and family life), Article 8 (protection of personal data) and Articles 51‑52 (on the field of application and the scope and interpretation of rights and principles); as well as Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 (the Data Protection Regulation). The proposed options are intended to improve the effectiveness of law enforcement (IA, p. 45, Annex 10, and explanatory memorandum, pp. 13‑14).
In terms of expected progress towards the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), the IA refers to SDG 16 (peace, justice and strong institutions). However, the IA does not go as far as assessing the expected implications that the proposal may have linked to the protection of personal data and privacy.11
Range of options considered
In line with BRG Tool #16, the IA adequately presents a baseline scenario showing the future evolution of the problems. It indicates that this scenario reflects the continuation of the current legal, governance and operational framework as set out in Regulation (EU) 2016/794, as amended, while it provides an overview of expected changes (IA, pp. 25‑27 and Annex 3, pp. 78‑80 on the cost of the baseline scenario). The Commission notes that, for the purposes of this IA, baseline projections envisage a Europol budget of €2.3‑2.9 billion over the 2028‑2034 multiannual financial framework, compared with €1.53 billion over the current framework (2021‑2027).
The IA identifies two policy options ('PO's) structured around two distinct policy directions, both aiming at strengthening Europol's role. It provides a useful overview of both policy options and the policy measures linked to them. Each option consists of a set of measures to address the initiative's specific objectives (see Table 1). The IA explains that some measures involve progressive improvements that can be implemented cumulatively, with PO2 building on and extending certain elements of PO1. Other measures, however, reflect distinct approaches specific to each option and are therefore not cumulative (IA, p. 28).
The IA states that 'the policy measures have been designed to address the two identified problem areas in a complementary manner'. According to the IA, one set of policy measures focuses primarily on addressing issues linked to information gaps, while the other set of measures would deal with improving Europol's operational support and specialised capabilities. The two sets would therefore be mutually reinforcing (IA, p. 28, see also the explanatory memorandum, pp. 11‑12). The IA also shares information about discarded policy options (IA, pp. 39‑40), including the idea of turning Europol into an autonomous agency with executive powers, as well as non‑legislative measures and more targeted changes to Europol's legal framework. The IA explains, although briefly, the reasons for not including these in the analysis.
However, the design and description of the options and the choice of preferred policy option raise some questions. First, it is questionable whether the IA is in line with the BRG requirement to 'identify and screen available options with a view to selecting the most relevant ones for analysis and comparison', allowing for an informed decision about which policy options to pursue (BRG, p. 32 and Tool #16 of the BRT). The IA ultimately retains seven of the eight policy measures examined, raising questions as to whether the assessment genuinely explores and compares alternative policy approaches or primarily substantiates a largely predetermined course of action. Although the IA assesses the measures against criteria such as effectiveness and efficiency, the limited exclusion of measures calls for a clearer justification of the preferred selection. Another issue is linked to the lack of development of several sub‑policy options, such as 1.2, 2.2 and 1.4. In addition, the IA does not present a clear overview of the policy options in function of each identified problem. The table introduced in Section 5.2 only refers to specific objectives and policy options, while it presents measures to be taken under each option without a clear reference to the problem and their drivers. Finally, the IA does not present stakeholders' views as part of the policy options' analysis, which would have benefited the analysis and clarified which stakeholders support which policy option and to what extent.
Assessment of impacts
In line with Tool #18, the IA qualitatively and quantitatively analyses the main economic, social, and environmental impacts of the policy options (IA, pp. 40‑48, 53‑56), and presents the analytical methods used, as well as details on methodology, estimates, assumptions and limitations throughout the IA and in Annexes 3, 4 and 10.12 The IA states that 'where sufficient data was available, impacts were quantified based on existing assessment and modelling' (IA, p. 40). It further notes that 'no regulatory charges, hassle costs, administrative costs or indirect costs were identified and therefore are not quantified' (Annex 3, p. 82). It further underlines that 'the preferred package generates cumulative impacts by combining measures that address different but interrelated drivers of the problem' (IA, p. 53), aiming to improve information flow, strengthen operation coordination and facilitate technical capabilities necessary for EU law enforcement cooperations. The analysis draws on the evidence collected through the study (which, however, is not publicly available at the time of writing) and is based on the assessment of expected impacts of the policy options. The IA also assesses potential effects on small and medium‑sized enterprises, on competitiveness, on security and EU citizens, on youth, on data protection, on digitalisation (also linked to the 'digital by default' principle), and potential administrative impacts on national authorities. The assessment uses impact ratings to indicate the magnitude of the impacts identified.13 However, a comparison table summarising the main findings of the detailed analysis would provide a useful overview.
Overall, while the assessment of impacts appears to largely be comprehensive and transparent, the analysis and evidence are presented in a rather fragmented manner, with some information available in the main text of the IA, and other explanations in the annexes (i.e. IA, chapters 6‑8, Annexes 3‑5 and 10). This fragmented presentation of the analysis and supporting data makes it challenging to gain a clear and comprehensive understanding of the expected impacts of the proposed measures. Furthermore, the report does not include any information on stakeholder views regarding either the design and choice of policy options or their expected impacts.
Economic impacts
The IA, along with the dedicated annexes, assesses the expected economic impacts of the proposed policy options, and considers the impacts on EU institutions and agencies and Member States. The IA provides a summary of costs relating to the policy options and the preferred option for Member States and Europol, an overview table for citizens/consumers, business and administrations (distinguishing between Member States and Europol), and a description of the analytical methods – data collection, methodology, underlying estimates – used for the assessment (IA pp. 40‑43, 49‑54, Annexes 3‑5 and Annex 10). The analysis could have considered potential implications at the regional or local level, particularly in relation to the procurement of law enforcement equipment and technologies (Annex 3, p. 94).
According to the IA, the main cost drivers stem from: a) the development of shared technological infrastructures; and b) operational integration measures, and the need for enhanced analytical and operational capabilities. The preferred option requires significant investment at both Union and Member State level. Notably, the IA states that the total estimated costs in 2028‑2034 would amount to approximately €590 million for Member States and €789 million for Europol. However, there are some inconsistencies in cost estimations between the main text (IA, pp. 40‑42) and Annex 3 (pp. 80‑90) regarding the estimated recurring costs for Europol under option 1.1 and option 2.4.
At the same time, the use of shared Union‑level infrastructure and capabilities is expected to deliver significant efficiency gains with estimated savings of around €42 million compared with separate implementation approaches (IA executive summary, p. 3, Annex 5, p. 107, explanatory memorandum, p. 14). Concerning the economic impact on Member States, the IA notes that it would vary depending on the operational capabilities developed at EU level (IA, p. 43). Overall, the policy options package entails cumulative investments at both Member State and EU level, while it expects to generate efficiencies through synergies and streamlined implementation (Annex 5, p. 107). The IA also discusses direct and indirect benefits for national law enforcement and judicial authorities, Europol, Eurojust, EPPO, and private parties. More specifically, it notes that the preferred option is linked to two areas where the direct benefits could result in substantial figures: a) potential efficiency gains from joint procurement in EU internal security, and b) potential gains due to the EU Police Cloud (Annex 3, pp. 94‑97, IA, executive summary, p. 3).
Environmental impacts
In its analysis of the environmental impacts, the IA underlines that the preferred option is not expected to have a direct impact on the environment. However, the proposal may have indirect positive effects as it would contribute to the detection and investigation of forms of environmental crime (which is listed among the areas of criminal activity in Annex I of the Europol Regulation), such as illegal waste trafficking or wildlife trafficking (IA, pp. 48 and 55).
Social impacts
The IA, along with the dedicated annexes, assesses social impacts as impacts related to the security of EU citizens, national authorities and youth. As indicated in the Commission's call for evidence, the legislative initiative is expected to generate significant social benefits by improving public safety, health, workers' safety, and strengthening online security across the EU. Efforts to tackle terrorism and radicalisation are also expected to reduce public fear, prevent violent extremism, and support safer, more resilient communities. Although no direct youth impacts are envisaged, the proposed measures may have indirect benefits for the protection and safety of young people across the Union.14 The IA underlines that each of the preferred (sub‑)policy options contributes to strengthening EU internal security since their effects are cumulative and mutually reinforcing (IA, p. 54). In terms of administrative impacts on national authorities, the IA explains that the proposal is expected to reduce administrative burden over time through a simplified exchange of information, improved legal clarity and more efficient operational cooperation.
Fundamental rights impact
Concerning fundamental rights, the IA notes that the policy options involve the processing of personal data in the context of law enforcement cooperation. This relates to Article 7 (respect for private and family life) and Article 8 (protection of personal data) of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights as well as the EU data protection framework, including Regulation (EU) 2018/1725. The IA discusses whether any interference with these rights can be justified as necessary and proportionate to the 'objective of general interest' of preventing, detecting and investigating serious and organised crime and terrorism. The impact on fundamental rights is mostly considered under the aspect of improving the fight against crime and terrorism as a benefit for citizens, but the need to ensure the respect of personal data protection is not sufficiently considered for the preferred option. With regard to the objective of general interest, the IA notes the significant contribution (++) towards prevention, detection and investigation of serious and organised crime and terrorism. This would subsequently support citizen protection as well as address evolving security threats across the EU, while respecting fundamental rights, data protection and the rule of law (IA, p. 55, Annex 5, p. 105).
With respect to the protection of personal data, the IA analyses the complexities around the proposed legislation in its main text and in Annexes 5 and 10, in terms of necessity and proportionality of the proposed measures. Although the IA states on several occasions that appropriate safeguards will be put in place to ensure that the measures are necessary and proportionate, it does not sufficiently explain how these safeguards will work in practice to mitigate data protection risks. In particular, the IA does not describe the mechanisms for effectively monitoring the implementation of safeguards or overseeing compliance with EU rules. Furthermore, the IA assesses the impact on the protection of personal data as neutral (IA, pp. 45‑46) under the baseline and policy option 1, without sufficiently explaining how it reached that conclusion. Although it states that the operational risks 'are considered limited and manageable within the existing EU data protection, cybersecurity and supervisory framework', it lacks a clear rationale. The explanatory memorandum (pp. 13‑14) mentions that the proposal preserves the core safeguards of the existing framework, including purpose limitation, necessity and proportionality requirements and independent supervision by the European Data Protection Supervisor, and the respective articles reflecting these statements (e.g. Chapter VIII of the proposed regulation). Nevertheless, neither the IA nor the proposal provide sufficiently robust justification and evidence to support this argument convincingly. Rather, the explanatory memorandum seeks to justify the interference with the rights enshrined in the relevant articles of the Charter arising from data processing as limited to what is necessary and proportionate for the performance of Europol's tasks. Finally, under section 6.3, the IA acknowledges that residual risks relating to cybersecurity, data concentration and broader operation access remain, and states that these will be mitigated through appropriate safeguards and measures. While the analysis of the policy options refers to the application of security‑by‑design and security‑by‑default principles and identifies a number of cybersecurity measures, including multi‑factor authentication, encryption, continuous security monitoring and incident detection and response capabilities (IA, p. 38), both the IA and the proposal provide limited explanation of how these safeguards will be implemented in practice and how their effectiveness will be monitored. Overall, the analysis of fundamental rights impacts (Tool #29) could go into greater depth and develop aspects such as the potential interference with individuals' rights and freedoms, for example concerning privacy and data protection principles and safeguards.
Impact on digitalisation
In line with the 'digital‑by‑default' principle (Tool #28), the IA stresses that the preferred option will have a positive impact on the digital transformation of EU law enforcement cooperation. It explains that the proposed measures support a more coherent and future‑proof digital transformation of EU internal security; and explicitly refers to the respective principle under the analysis of policy options 1.1 and 1.3 (Annex 10).
Following the analysis and comparison of policy options with regard to their effectiveness, efficiency, coherence, and in terms of compliance with fundamental rights, using a multi‑criteria assessment, the IA concludes that the preferred package of options consists of options 1.1, 2.1, and 2.2 to address information gaps, and options 1.3, 1.4, 2.3 and 2.4 to address operational gaps/shortcomings.15 Using comparative scoring to identify the preferred option, the IA finds this combination would address both the information gaps affecting Europol's role as an information hub and the operational limitations that constrain timely and effective support for investigations, with advanced capabilities acting as a cross‑cutting enabler. The IA states that the selected options form a coherent, cumulative and scalable package (IA, p. 52, and Annex 5, p. 103). However, the comparison of options (and the assessment of impacts) still lack detail and clarity to strengthen the assessment. Another issue is linked to the presentation of the non‑retained options. The IA claims that sub‑policy option 1.3 was not retained as fully exploiting the potential between Europol and the EPPO would require substantial reinforcements'. However, this appears inconsistent with the preferred policy package (IA, p. 52) and Chapter IV of the proposal concerning relations with Union entities. Finally, while the assessment of impacts appears comprehensive to a certain extent, the references to stakeholders' views have not been presented as part of the analysis to explain whether and to what extent divergent views have been considered. A better explanation of the relevant aspects considered under each criterion as well as a clarification of any contradictions would have benefited the analysis.
Feasibility
The IA (IA, p. 56, Annexes 5 and 10) further compares the policy options in terms of their technical and political feasibility (see Tool #16 for more information about these criteria). From a legal perspective, the IA underlines the need for targeted legislative amendments with regard to policy measures 1.3 and 2.4. (Annex 10, pp. 162, 176).
SMEs / Competitiveness
The IA considers that there are no direct or indirect impacts on private operators or small and medium‑sized enterprises (SMEs), or on competitiveness (IA, p. 45, Annex 3, p. 90, Annex 10, p. 154, Annex 11, p. 177).
Simplification, burden reduction and other regulatory implications
In line with the REFIT initiative, the IA explains the proposed revisions aim to streamline procedures and improve the efficiency of EU law enforcement cooperation. Although they may lead to additional Member State engagement, the positive effects would counter‑balance these efforts: notably improved operational support, faster cross‑border investigations and increased efficiency in the use of EU‑level analytical capabilities, coupled with the reduced administrative burden envisaged in the proposed simplification of data subject classification under sub‑policy option 2.2.
In light of the 'one in, one out' (OIOO) principle (Tool #59), the IA concludes that this initiative does not entail administrative costs or savings for businesses (including SMEs), as it primarily concerns public authorities involved in law enforcement cooperation without introducing new regulatory obligations for the private sector. At the same time, it does not generate direct costs for citizens (IA, p. 56, Annex 3, p. 90, Annex 11, p. 177).
Monitoring and evaluation
The IA presents (IA, p. 57 and Annex 6) the monitoring framework designed for this initiative, linking the indicators with each specific objective (Tool #43). Monitoring will track output (e.g. volume and quality of information exchange), results (e.g. investigative acceleration) and expected impacts (e.g. less fragmented operational coordination), to facilitate the assessment of operation success over time. The IA also highlights that careful consideration will be given to data protection compliance, proportionality and fundamental rights safeguards, including EDPS supervision. Indicators will draw on a range of existing sources, including Europol's existing reporting instruments,16 EDPS supervisory findings and data protection reporting, and will be collected on an annual basis. While the IA broadly addresses performance measurement, it does not clearly distinguish between output, outcomes and impacts. In addition, it does not sufficiently explain how data‑protection compliance, fundamental rights safeguards and proportionality will be taken into consideration throughout the process.
In terms of evaluation, the IA suggests monitoring the impacts of the preferred option through the existing evaluation and reporting framework under Article 68 of the Europol Regulation, according to which the 'European Commission must ensure an evaluation of Europol is carried out by 1 May 2022 and every five years thereafter'. On the other hand, the IA (p. 57 and Annex 6) notes that the Commission will carry out an evaluation of the initiative four years after its entry into force to assess its effectiveness, efficiency, coherence, relevance and EU added value, and to inform any future legislative revision. In assessing the proposed regulation, Article 130 (on evaluation and review) refers to the requirement to conduct an evaluation 'not later than … [five years after the entry into force of this Regulation], and every five years thereafter' which appears to be in line with Article 68 of the Europol Regulation. However, neither the IA nor the proposal provides a clear indication of when the evaluation is to be carried out.
Stakeholder consultation
In accordance with the BRG and Better Regulation Toolbox (Tool #54), the IA provides a detailed description of all consultation activities (Annex 2), covering May 2025 to March 2026. The consultation strategy followed three main phases and consisted of extensive consultation with Member States, in‑depth evidence gathering, and discussion at political level.
| Stakeholder consultation | Period | Number of replies (type of stakeholders) |
|---|---|---|
| Consultation with Member States at policy and senior official level | May‑June 2025 | Scoping discussions with the Member States were held in multiple fora, such as the EU Council Standing Committee on Internal Security (COSI), the High‑Level Forum on the Future of EU Criminal Justice, and the EU Council Law Enforcement Working Party (LEWP) |
| Call for evidence on the new Europol Regulation | 03.07.2025‑ 31.07.2025 |
17 (and 6 position papers) (including academic/research organisations, business associations, companies/businesses, non‑governmental organisations, trade unions, and EU citizens) |
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Public consultation on the new Europol Regulation | 23.10.2025‑15.01.2026 |
33 (and 8 position papers) (including public authorities, business associations, companies/businesses, non‑governmental organisations, consumer organisations, and EU citizens) |
| Four thematic workshops on the future of Europol (technical level) | 06.11.2025‑19.12.2025 | DG HOME, Member State experts, Europol, EPPO |
| Targeted consultation in the context of the external supporting study | July 2025‑March 2026 | Six targeted surveys, more than 135 stakeholder interviews (12 exploratory interviews followed by more than 123 targeted interviews), six field visits, and three focus group meetings (more details available in Annex 2, pp. 69‑74) |
Overall, the results are reported in an efficient and transparent manner. The annex presents a synthesis of stakeholder feedback collected where divergent views have been included in a transparent manner. In addition, a factual summary report of the public consultation is publicly available on the Commission's Have your say website. Nevertheless, the Commission does not present stakeholder feedback in a consistent manner throughout its analysis of the different aspects of the IA, but only as part of the evaluation (Annex 7) and the feasibility assessment (Annex 10). The feedback from this consultation strategy could have been better reflected in the main IA report, particularly regarding the analysis of the available policy options, their potential impacts and the preferred option with clear indication of stakeholder feedback.
Supporting data and analytical methods used
The IA draws on generally well‑evidenced data sources and reports to inform its analysis, although some deficiencies remain. In addition to the stakeholder consultation, the IA draws on the evaluation report and the evaluation of the Europol Regulation (available in Annex 7). It also builds on the findings of the study that contributed to the evidence base for this back‑to‑back evaluation and impact assessment.17 According to Annex 1, observational data complement stakeholder views, reinforcing the evidence base. However, the IA does not provide a comprehensive list of sources regarding the evidence underpinning its analysis. It nevertheless describes the methods used to collect and analyse evidence in support of the revision of the Europol Regulation.
Annex 4 provides a detailed account of the methodology, particularly the approaches used to assess impacts and estimate costs. The IA is transparent about the underlying assumptions and limitations of the available data as well as the resulting uncertainties (IA, Annexes 3, 4 and 10). Nevertheless, while the IA indicates that quantification is based on existing assessments or modelling (IA, p. 40), it does not identify or describe the models used. Furthermore, although the IA draws on a range of reports and other sources, the evidence base appears to rely predominantly on material produced by EU institutions and agencies, with limited evidence of a broad range of stakeholder perspectives.
Follow‑up to the Commission Regulatory Scrutiny Board opinion
On 17 April 2026, the Regulatory Scrutiny Board (RSB) issued a positive opinion with reservations on the draft version of the IA. The RSB criticised significant shortcomings in key parts of the draft IA that the Commission was expected to address relating to: (a) the magnitude of the problems, (b) the formulation of the specific objectives in 'SMART' terms, (c) better description of the policy measures, (d) the assessment of impacts, in particular on fundamental rights, data protection and cybersecurity, (e) the assessment of costs, and (f) the monitoring and evaluation framework.
As required in the BRG, the IA explains how the RSB's recommendations were addressed (Annex 1, pp. 58‑61). Although the draft IA on which the RSB opinion was based is not publicly available, it appears that efforts were made to address these recommendations through revisions in the main part of the IA and in the annexes; although Annex 1 does not explain which chapters of the IA were influenced by these updates. Nevertheless, some issues identified by the RSB remain problematic, particularly regarding compliance with the S.M.A.R.T. criteria, the analysis of fundamental right impacts, the assessment of costs, and the need to strengthen the monitoring and evaluation framework.
Coherence between the Commission's legislative proposal and the IA
The legislative proposal18 appears overall to be in line with the preferred policy option package described in the IA. Nevertheless, the legal basis proposed in the IA (Article 88 TFEU) is not fully aligned with that presented in the proposal (Article 87(2), point (a), and Article 88 TFEU). One noteworthy addition in the proposal, highlighting an inconsistency between the proposal and the IA, is the introduction of a change at governance level that was not analysed in the IA. Notably, Article 75 establishes an Executive Board to support the agency's Management Board in line with the two‑layer governance model recommended for EU agencies. Moreover, Article 66 provides for regular contact and consultation between Europol and the Capability and Innovation Advisory Group established under Article 67. However, the IA does not discuss this arrangement or its potential economic (or other) impacts. Furthermore, there is an inconsistency between the presentation of the non‑retained options, the preferred option package and the proposed regulation concerning sub‑policy option 1.3. Finally, in terms of evaluation, the IA and the proposal present mixed approaches about the planning envisaged for the evaluation of the legislation (see monitoring and evaluation section above).
Endnotes
Classification
Policy areas: Ex-ante Impact Assessment | Area of Freedom, Security and Justice
Regions: European Union
Committees: Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs (LIBE)
Statement on the use of AI
Any AI‑generated content in this text has been reviewed by the authors.
Disclaimer
This document is prepared for, and addressed to, the Members and staff of the European Parliament as background material to assist them in their parliamentary work. The content of the document is the sole responsibility of its author(s) and any opinions expressed herein should not be taken to represent an official position of the Parliament.
