The African Union's response to coups d'État Strong framework, uneven implementation
Summary
Since 2020, worsening governance and insecurity across Africa have fuelled a sharp increase in military coups, as well as a growing trend of constitutional and electoral manipulations by leaders seeking to prevent genuine political alternation. While the African Union (AU) has developed a comprehensive framework to address such unconstitutional changes of government (UCGs), implementation has been uneven in practice. The AU generally acts swiftly to suspend member states following military coups, but has applied additional sanctions unevenly. The AU's response to constitutional or electoral manoeuvres has been even more cautious, and has sometimes resulted in lifting suspensions after elections won by coup leaders, despite AU rules barring them from standing for such elections. This contradiction reflects a strategic dilemma; between deterring future violations, or prioritising regional cooperation and engagement, even with illegitimate leaders. Recent initiatives, including the Accra and Malabo Declarations, seek to strengthen early warning, improve coordination with African Regional Economic Communities, and address deeper governance failures. However, reforms remain incomplete and inconsistently applied.
The EU generally aligns with AU positions, prioritising stability and African‑led solutions. The European Parliament also supports most AU decisions on UCGs and calls on the EU to adapt its cooperation with affected countries accordingly.
This briefing updates part of a previous briefing by Ionel Zamfir, African Union instruments to protect human rights and democracy, EPRS, November 2022.
A surge in unconstitutional changes of government
According to latest (2024) Ibrahim Index, almost half of Africans live in countries where governance has deteriorated over the past decade, with declining security as the principal driver. This has contributed to a surge of unconstitutional changes of government (UCGs).
Since 2020, governments have been overthrown by military interventions in Mali, Guinea, Sudan, Burkina Faso, Niger, Gabon, Madagascar and Guinea‑Bissau (see Table 1). All occurred in a context of weakened government legitimacy, notably due to failures to address social and economic grievances or insurgent attacks.
In addition, several governments have sought to prevent genuine political alternation through legal or institutional reforms, such as the extension, removal or circumvention of presidential terms or age limits, amending electoral laws, or changing the electoral commission or constitutional court. Such changes – often referred to as 'constitutional coups' or 'electoral coups' – erode public trust in democracy, and can in turn be used to justify military overthrows.1
Since its inception, the AU has developed mechanisms to prevent and respond to UCGs, and the recent surge (see Table 1) has triggered a need to address their weaknesses and strengthen their effectiveness.
The African Union mechanisms against coups
Main frameworks
Interestingly, the Constitutive Act of the African Union and the Lomé Declaration on unconstitutional changes of government were adopted by African leaders at the same summit in July 2000. The Constitutive Act lists the 'condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional changes of governments' among the AU's governing principles, while the Lomé Declaration identifies four forms of unconstitutional changes of government:
-
three of them focus on coups by the military, mercenaries, or armed rebel groups,
-
the fourth form consists in the refusal by a government in place to acknowledge its defeat in elections and to transfer powers to the winning party.
The African Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (hereafter referred to as the ACDEG or the Charter on Democracy) – in force since 2012, but binding in only the 39 states that have ratified it – adds a fifth form, in Article 23: any constitutional or legal revision intended to prevent democratic alternation in power.
To guide implementation, the Ezulwini Framework (2009) proposes a comprehensive and coordinated approach of the AU and Africa's Regional Economic Communities (RECs) in early warning, preventive diplomacy, and post‑coup engagement.
Institutions and instruments
The Peace and Security Council (PSC) created in 2003 as the standing body of the AU for conflict prevention and management, has 15 members, elected on a regional basis by the AU Executive Council and endorsed by the AU Assembly. It can 'institute sanctions' against coups, although their scope is undefined, giving it broad discretion. It may declare a government change as unconstitutional, suspend authorities from AU activities, and lift sanctions once constitutional order is restored.2
The Assembly of Heads of State and Government (AU Assembly) is the highest decision‑making body. Beyond endorsing the PSC and Executive Council's decisions, it may impose targeted sanctions on coup leaders.
The AU Commission's Departments of Political Affairs (PA) and of Peace and Security (PS) merged in 2020 into the Political Affairs, Peace and Security Department (PAPS), responsible for ensuring member states' compliance with the Charter on Democracy. It oversees AU election observation missions, monitors threats through the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS), reports democratic breaches and implements AU sanctions.
The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM, launched 2003) relies on voluntary self‑assessment of participating countries' political, economic and corporate governance. The process involves national consultations with civil society, external evaluation and peer review, leading to recommendations and action plans. However. several shortcomings, including very slow processing and a lack of progress between reviews, limit its impact.
The African Governance Architecture (AGA), launched in 2011, aims to foster dialogue and coordination among AU and REC governance and human‑rights bodies.The creation of PAPS aimed to strengthen links between the AGA and the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), acknowledging that governance failures and security crises are closely interconnected.
The Panel of the Wise, five African figures 'who have made outstanding contributions to Africa in the areas of peace, security and development' provide advice and diplomatic support to the PSC. As of March 2026, the North Africa seat has remained vacant.
Specialised bodies such as the AU Counter Terrorism Centre (AUCTC), the AU mechanism for police cooperation (Afripol) and the Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA) also collaborate to address coup risks and harness early warning systems.
Sanctions
The Lomé Declaration envisages sanctions against a 'regime that stubbornly refuses to restore constitutional order' but does not elaborate on their nature. In the AU constitutive act, the only sanction mentioned is the suspension of governments established by coups in all AU activities (Article 30). Some analysts contend that this suspension has little impact, as coups themselves signal a shift away from the AU and its partners.
In 2010, the AU Assembly decided that additional measures 'shall apply', namely: banning the instigators of a coup from participating in elections held to restore constitutional order, sanctioning AU member states supporting coups in other states, and 'other sanctions, including punitive economic sanctions.' In the meantime, the Charter on Democracy had set out a more explicit list of sanctions for perpetrators. It bans the coup leaders not only from participating in the subsequent democratic elections, but also from holding key political positions (Article 25(4)) They may also face economic sanctions and trial before a 'competent AU court'.3 However, only the 39 states that ratified the Charter on Democracy are committed to bringing instigators of a coup to justice.
Renewed approach
The Accra and Malabo Declarations (2022)
The resurgence of coups has prompted renewed reflection within the AU. Following recommendations by the PSC to identify gaps in the African Governance Architecture and the 2000 Lomé Declaration on UCGs, in February 2022, the AU Assembly called for an analysis of the causes and impact of this surge; with the objective of adapting its mechanisms. One month later, the PSC convened the first Reflection Forum on UCGs in Accra (Ghana), bringing together AU member states, constitutional experts and civil society. The resulting Accra Declaration reaffirmed the AU's zero‑tolerance policy for any form of unconstitutional change of government, while acknowledging that UCGs are often symptoms of deeper governance failures. The participants in the forum advocated for better early warning systems and clearer continental and regional standards, to ensure that sanctions are applied consistently and do not harm populations. They also called for AU member states to uphold their constitution's provisions and political pluralism. They stressed that corruption, poor governance, political exclusion, as well as persistent socio‑economic inequalities often erode public confidence in governments. The declaration therefore advocated for stronger democratic institutions and accountability, and greater participation of women and young people. It also condemned foreign interference and disinformation campaigns that facilitate or legitimise coups. The Accra Declaration's recommendations were endorsed by the heads of state and government at the May 2022 extraordinary summit in Malabo, Equatorial Guinea (the Malabo Declaration).
The Africa Governance Report (2023)
The AU Assembly's February 2022 call was further addressed in the APRM's and AGA's Africa Governance Report of 2023. It identifies five interconnected drivers eroding public trust in governments, and increasing the risk of popular support for a military intervention:
-
flawed electoral processes;
-
constitutional manipulation and a concentration of power in the executive, which weakens legislative and judiciary oversight;
-
public sector corruption and lack of accountability, especially amid poor economic performance and high inequalities;
-
marginalisation of the opposition and critical social groups, such as women and youth, involving human rights violations;
-
growing political and economic influence of the military,combined with terrorism threats; which weakens civilian governance.
To reduce the risk of coups, the report recommends strengthening:
-
political legitimacy through stricter presidential term limits, constitutional review mechanisms, judicial independence and military neutrality, while ensuring more inclusive representation;
-
public service delivery through action against corruption and illicit financial flows, greater investment in health, education and social protection, and stronger protection of fundamental freedoms.
The report further urged all AU member states to ratify and fully implement the Charter on Democracy and to comply with the decisions of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights.
The Accra II forum (2024) and the ongoing study on UCGs
In March 2024, a second Reflection Forum on UCGs ('Accra II forum') assessed the implementation of the 2022 Accra and Malabo Declarations – at a time when the number of AU member states suspended due to a coup had risen from four (Sudan, Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso) to six (with Niger and Gabon suspended in August 2023). Reaffirming an 'unequivocal condemnation of any form of ascent to power that is outside constitutional provisions', the forum considered the root causes behind the coup resurgence and ways to uphold democracy, with contributions of civil society representatives. It also highlighted the need to improve knowledge sharing and coordination between the AU, its member states and RECs.
A study on unconstitutional changes of government was submitted to the PSC in November 2025. It called for stronger preventive policy through the early warning mechanisms. However, the PSC postponed its conclusions on this study and requested a review to better take into account foreign interference and the diversity of governance systems.4
AU institutional adaptations
In response to the recommendations of the Accra and Malabo Declarations, the AU has introduced institutional reforms to strengthen its response to UCGs. However, their implementation remains uneven.
-
The PSC sanctions committee was revived in 2024 to achieve a more consistent policy, through advice on imposing or lifting sanctions and monitoring their effectiveness. The South African Institute for Security Studies (ISS) mentions that the revived sanctions committee was tasked in July 2024 to 'identify external actors supporting the warring factions in Sudan'. However, in February 2026, a ministerial‑level PSC communiqué urged the sanctions committee to 'expedite' this task and submit proposals within no more than three months; suggesting that the sanctions committee faced challenges in performing its duties.
-
Reflecting concerns over constitutional manipulation as a growing threat to democratic alternation, the Accra and Malabo Declarations called for the AU Commission to prepare continent‑wide guidelines for amending constitutions. They have not been officially adopted yet.
-
Despite the PAPS merger in 2020, observers note that this has not led to an effective coordination mechanism between the AGA and APSA to address the links between governance deficits and peace and security challenges.
AU action in practice
Response against military coups
Following recent military coups, the AU's PSC has consistently suspended Mali (in August 2020; lifted in October, reinstated in June 2021), Guinea (in September 2021; lifted in January 2026 after a transitional process and a presidential election), Sudan (October 2021), Burkina Faso (January 2022), Niger (August 2023), Gabon (August 2023; lifted in April 2025 after a transitional process and a presidential election), Madagascar (October 2025) and Guinea Bissau (November 2025). Most suspensions occurred within days after the coups, except for Niger, suspended after nearly one month – suggesting hesitation between sticking to the zero‑tolerance rule and consideration for Niger's role against insurgencies.
AU suspension decisions are often more consistent than those of the RECs. For example, like the AU, the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) suspended Gabon in 2023 but lifted the suspension much earlier, in March 2024, despite slow progress towards democratic restoration. Contrary to the AU, the three RECs to which Sudan belongs have not suspended it from membership.5
Additional AU sanctions on coup leaders (such as travel bans and asset freezes) and the concerned country (like trade restrictions and state asset freezes) often depend on the RECs' will and capacity to implement them. In particular, AU sanctions generally align with those of the Economic Community Of West African States (ECOWAS), which has strong governance tools and has imposed targeted sanctions against coup leaders, as well as comprehensive economic sanctions against the concerned countries.6 However, while ECOWAS had envisaged a military intervention in Niger, the AU PSC rejected this possibility.
Addressing coups against authoritarian leaders
After the 2010‑2011 Arab Spring uprisings, the AU's response was put to the test, notably when General Al‑Sissi's government contested Egypt's suspension from the AU in 2013, arguing that President Morsi's removal reflected popular demands. An AU High‑Level Panel on Egypt then attempted to clarify the issue of UCGs. Its 2014 report proposed guidelines to exclude some changes of government from the UCG definition, provided that:
-
they result from a broad‑based and peaceful popular mobilisation against an authoritarian regime;
-
constitutional means have proved ineffective; and
-
the military is not involved in removing the government.
These guidelines, designed to avoid fluctuating implementation of the AU framework, have not been formally adopted by the AU, and in any case the AU has not been faced with the ousting of a government without military involvement since.
Moreover, although the Charter on Democracy defines UCGs as actions 'against a democratically elected government', the AU has also sanctioned coups against leaders with a weak democratic legitimacy. For example, it suspended Guinea in 2021 and Gabon in 2023, despite the fact that the incumbent leaders had been re‑appointed after contested elections and legal manipulations to extend their term limits. However, the timing of responses against such military coups has varied. For example, in Sudan, the PSC first asked for a transition process to be put in place after the April 2019 coup against President Al‑Bashir and only suspended the country in September 2019, after several deadlines for installing a civilian government had been missed. Meanwhile, in Madagascar, the suspension was immediate, despite a clear popular support for the military intervention against President Rajoelina.
More leniency towards 'constitutional coups'
Recent history suggests that the AU has rarely condemned practices that seem to fall within the scope of 'illegal means of accessing or maintaining power', targeted by Article 23(5) of the Charter on Democracy (see definitions, above, and notes under Table 1). In fact, no clear criteria define whether a legal revision aims to prevent democratic alternation and constitutes a UCG, or remains a legitimate sovereign act. As a result, the PSC's decisions on suspensions following constitutional or legal changes are made on a case by case basis. For instance, after what could be identified as a constitutional coup, Chad was not suspended from the AU, partly due to its 'pivotal role' in regional security. Significantly, the AU Assembly of Heads of State and Government endorses suspensions and decides on sanctions mainly by consensus, therefore making it difficult for leaders to sanction peers over practices some of them have also envisaged or triggered in their own country.
The AU's perceived reluctance to sanction abuse of powers also appears to extend to coup leaders in suspended countries. As mentioned above, under Article 25(4) of the Charter on Democracy, coup leaders cannot participate in elections organised to restore constitutional order. However, the AU has failed to consistently apply this principle.
-
In Chad, Mahamat Idriss Déby won the presidential election in May 2024 and was congratulated by the AU after leading the transition that followed the military takeover in 2021. In this case, article 25(4) could not be invoked as the AU did not qualify his seizure of power as a coup.
-
In Gabon, Article 25(4) should have prevented the coup leader, General Brice Oligui Nguema, from running for the presidential election. He nonetheless did, and won in April 2025 with more than 90 % of the vote. The AU neither condemned his candidacy nor questioned the result; instead it considered his victory as a return to constitutional order, and subsequently lifted Gabon's suspension from the AU.
-
Similarly, General Mamady Doumbouya, who seized power in Guinea in September 2021, won the contested December 2025 presidential election with 86.72 % of the vote. He was congratulated by the PSC and Guinea's suspension from the AU was lifted.
This tolerance may reflect concerns that prolonged suspensions weaken regional cooperation and create opportunities for external players, such as Russia or Gulf countries. By contrast, critics argue that, by allowing coup leaders to legitimise their rule through elections instead of applying Article 25(4), the AU undermines its anti‑coup framework, as this creates a precedent that weakens the stability of many African governments.
EU support
The EU is a major external funder of the AU, and notably provides financial resources, technical expertise and diplomatic support on security and governance. At the same time, it considers the AU and RECs to be primarily responsible for managing political and security crises on the continent.
In this context, the EU has generally aligned its responses with those of the AU and RECs, particularly ECOWAS, condemning military coups in Africa and calling for a rapid return to constitutional rule. The EU has typically suspended development cooperation and/or imposed sanctions as a way of political pressure against countries suspended by the AU. However, while the AU suspended Gabon after the 2023 military takeover, the EU did not apply significant retaliatory measures against the country, suggesting that it took into account the fact that the coup occurred after flawed elections.
As regards 'constitutional coups', the EU has taken a cautious approach, similar to the AU's, often prioritising stability over full respect of democratic norms. In line with the AU, the UN and France, the EU did not sanction Chad after the unconstitutional change of government in 2021. The EU did not always trigger 'appropriate measures' against leaders clinging to power through borderline legal changes, as illustrated in Table 1. The EU also favours diplomatic engagement over force. In the case with Niger in 2023, for instance, the EU, like the AU, did not support a military intervention, as envisaged by ECOWAS, to reinstate President Bazoum.
European Parliament positions
The European Parliament has consistently expressed strong support for AU (and ECOWAS) decisions on UCGs. Its resolutions regularly condemn military coups and call on Member States and institutions to support African-led efforts to restore constitutional order. In several resolutions, notably on 5 May and 15 December 2022, it stated that the EU should question cooperation with transitional governments if they do not set a realistic timeframe for the return to constitutional order. Parliament does not explicitly condemn electoral or constitutional coups, but addresses human‑rights related concerns, as it did on 27 November 2025 in its resolution on the post-election killings in Tanzania (in this context, it also reproached the Commission's draft decision on the 2026 financing for Tanzania, for not taking Parliament's concerns into account).
Parliament also uses parliamentary diplomacy through its delegation for relations with the Pan‑African Parliament (DPAP) and the presence of Members in the Africa-EU Parliamentary Assembly – a subset of the Joint Parliamentary Assembly established in the framework of the Samoa agreement between the EU and the Organisation of African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) States. In 2013, the ACP-EU Joint Parliamentary Assembly noted that preventing coups requires tackling corruption, resource mismanagement, and tensions between communities.
Main references
- Africa Governance Report 2023: Unconstitutional changes of government in Africa, African Peer Review Mechanism, 2023.
- The 2025 Review of the AU Peace and Security Council, Amani Africa, 2026
- Van Damme, P., African electoral coups should be treated as such, coups, ECDPM, 2025.
Endnotes
Annex
| Country | Normandy Index 2025 scorei | Date of UCG | Type of UCGii | AU suspension | Additional AU (and REC) measuresiii, iv | EU responseiii, v |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Mali | 3.70 | 18/08/2020 | M | 19/08/2020–9/10/2020 | (ECOWAS: economic sanctions) | Suspended EU military training mission. |
| Mali | 3.70 | 24/05/2021 | M | 1/06/2021–present | (ECOWAS: economic sanctions, targeted sanctions). AU warned of targeted sanctions | Warned of targeted sanctions. |
| Guinea a | 4.97 | 18/10/2020 | C | Not suspended | – | Expressed concern |
| Guinea | 4.97 | 5/09/2021 | M | 10/09/2021–22/01/2026 | (ECOWAS: targeted sanctions)
AU suspension lifted after the election of the coup leader as president | Condemned. No specific sanctions. |
| Chad b | 3.55 | 20/04/2021 | C | Not suspended | – | European Parliament resolutions against the military seizure (2021) and crackdown on protests (2022). |
| Sudan | 4.34 | 25/10/2021 | M | 27/10/2021–present | – | Condemned. Suspended budget support. |
| Burkina Faso | 4.58 | 24/01/2022
and 30/09/2022 | M | 31/01/2022–present | ECOWAS and AU: asset freezes, travel bans. No economic sanctions. | Condemned. Supported ECOWAS mediation. |
| Niger | 4.41 | 26/07/2023 | M | 14/08/2023– present | (ECOWAS: economic and targeted sanctions ‑ lifted in February 2024) | Suspended budget support and military cooperation.
Threatened with targeted sanctions. |
| CAR c | 3.37 | 30/07/2023 | C | Not suspended | – | Expressed concern. No specific sanctions. |
| Gabon d | 5.66 | 30/08/2023 | E | Not suspended | – | Acknowledged irregularities in the election. |
| Gabon | 5.66 | 30/08/2023 | M | 31/08/2023–30/04/2025 | AU suspension lifted after the election of the coup leader as president | – |
| Togo e | 5.27 | 6/05/2024 | C | Not suspended | – | – |
| Cameroon f | 4.44 | 12/10/2025 | E | Not suspended | – | – |
| Madagascar | 6.22 | 14/10/2025 | M | 15/10/2025–present | AU: warned of targeted sanctions | Condemned. No specific sanctions. |
| Côte d'Ivoire g | 5.57 | 25/10/2025 | C/E | Not suspended | – | – |
| Tanzania h | 6.03 | 29/10/2025 | E | Not suspended | (SADC: denounced fraud elections and violence) | No specific sanctions. European Parliament denounced fraught elections and violence, called for a thorough revision of EU aid. |
| Guinea‑Bissau | 5.69 | 26/11/2025 | M | 28/11/2025–present | – | Condemned. No specific sanctions. |
| DRC j | 4.88 | 09/06/2026 | C | Not suspended | – | No (new) sanctions. |
Legend:
i The Normandy Index (NI) ranks 138 countries based on their resilience against threats to peace – with lower NI scores indicating higher risks to peace, security and democracy. With the exception of Madagascar and Tanzania, countries that have experienced a UCG since 2020 are (and were at the time of the UCG) below the global average on the Normandy Index. ii M: military coup; C: contested constitutional change; E: suspected electoral manipulations. iii Measures directly taken in response to the coup; others might have been adopted in different circumstances. iv Typically border closure; suspension of financial and trade transactions. v Typically asset freezes and travel bans against coup leaders.
a In October 2020, President Condé secured a third term in Guinea, after a contested referendum in March 2020 removed the constitutional limit. One year later, the military cited the erosion of constitutional order as one reason for overthrowing him.
b In April 2021, after Chad's President Idriss Déby's death, the army suspended the Constitution (which provided for the interim transfer of power to the President of the National Assembly) and instead appointed Mahamat Déby, the late President's son, to lead a Transitional Military Council.
c In the Central African Republic (CAR), the Constitutional Court's president was removed from office in 2022 after opposing the organisation of a referendum to remove presidential term limits. Held in July 2023, this referendum opened the way for President Touadéra to be elected for a third term in December 2025.
d In Gabon, a change to voting rules required voters to support the same party in the presidential and legislative elections. Together with other suspected manipulations, this contributed to President Bongo's large victory in August 2023. He was overthrown on the day his re‑election was announced.
e Constitutional reforms adopted in 2024 in Togo enabled President Faure Gnassingbé to become Prime Minister in May 2024, while retaining most of his presidential powers and bypassing term limits. The presidential election scheduled for 2025 was subsequently cancelled.
f In Cameroon, President Biya won an eighth term in October 2025 after a last‑minute surge in turnout favoured him, a result many observers considered implausible.
g In Côte d'Ivoire, President Ouattara, who was allowed to run for elections due to a term‑limit change in 2020, won a fourth term in October 2025 with 89.8 % of the votes. The near‑100 % vote for him in his northern strongholds raised questions about the credibility of the results.
h Tanzania's President Hassan, appointed after Magufuli's death in 2021, won her first election with 97.66 % of the votes on 29 October 2025. However, as most opponents either had disappeared, been jailed, killed or barred from the ballot, and protests were violently repressed, the regional community (SADC) election‑observation mission declared that the election failed to meet regional standards.
j In the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), the National Assembly passed a bill on 9 June 2026 to organise a referendum on constitutional reform, ahead of the 2028 elections. Opposition members boycotted the vote, and called the reform a 'constitutional coup', arguing it would enable President Tshisekedi to bypass term limits.
Classification
Policy areas: Foreign Affairs
Regions: Sub-Saharan Africa, Mediterranean and Middle East
Committees: Foreign Affairs (AFET)
Statement on the use of AI
Any AI‑generated content in this text has been reviewed and edited by the author. AI tools (Perplexity and NotebookLM) were used to explore the range of sources available to the author.
Disclaimer
This document is prepared for, and addressed to, the Members and staff of the European Parliament as background material to assist them in their parliamentary work. The content of the document is the sole responsibility of its author(s) and any opinions expressed herein should not be taken to represent an official position of the Parliament.
