Chips act 2.0: Boosting the EU semiconductor industry
Context
The European Commission published the chips act 2.0 legislative proposal on 3 June 2026. It is part of the technological sovereignty package alongside the proposals for a cloud and artificial intelligence (AI) development act (CADA), an EU open source strategy, and a strategic roadmap for digitalisation and AI in energy.
The proposal for a chips act 2.0 seeks to strengthen Europe's semiconductor industry and reduce strategic dependencies, boost demand for chips, support the design and production of advanced and mainstream chips in the European Union (EU), and simplify the regulatory framework.
It follows on from the EU Chips Act, adopted in 2023, that marked the EU's first coordinated response to critical vulnerabilities in the global semiconductor supply chain. It was meant to help double Europe's global market share to 20 % in 2030.
The proposed chips act 2.0 would retain the same structure, and would remain organised around three pillars:
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pillar 1: research and development (R&D) and capacity building ('chips for Europe' initiative 2.0);
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pillar 2: security of supply and demand;
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pillar 3: monitoring and crisis response.
Three years after a first Chips Act with mixed results – the EU currently accounts for less than 10 % of global semiconductor production and remains highly dependent on external suppliers for leading‑edge semiconductors – the Commission carried out a thorough review of the legislative framework. Some positive outcomes have nevertheless been achieved, such as the establishment of varied infrastructure including competence centres, an EU Chips Design Platform (EuroCDP), and five state-of-the-art pilot lines.
The proposal seeks to correct the gaps identified in the 2023 Chips Act: too focused on the construction of gigafactories, not enough on advanced design, packaging, materials and industrial demand. Fine‑tuning is also needed to incorporate the growing prominence of AI, as AI‑related components are expected to make up over 70 % of the semiconductor market by 2030. The proposal seeks to address these challenges by supporting both the supply and demand sides of the EU semiconductor ecosystem, while strengthening areas where it already excels (expertise in R&D and equipment, cutting‑edge chip research, and lithography systems production).
Legislative proposal
2026/0139 (COD) – Proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on a framework of measures for strengthening the Union's semiconductor ecosystem, repealing Regulation (EU) 2023/1781 (Chips Act 2.0) – COM(2026) 504, 3.6.2026.
Next steps in the European Parliament
For the latest developments in this legislative procedure, see the Legislative Train Schedule:
Issue
Semiconductors are the world's third most traded commodity, after oil and vehicles, with global revenues reaching US$796 billion in 2025.
The market is projected to grow 90 % in 2026, reaching US$1.51 trillion, and to surpass US$1.91 trillion in 2027. Continued strong demand for AI infrastructure, high‑bandwidth memory (HBM1), and accelerated computing platforms2 remain the primary growth catalyst for the semiconductor industry. As a critical supplier and enabler for all modern industries and the infrastructure that supports them, the semiconductor sector has evolved into a strategic resource.
Despite progress and the EU's strengths in key segments of the semiconductor value chain – such as mainstream semiconductor production (power electronics, microcontrollers, photonics, sensors), manufacturing equipment, and materials – clear capability shortfalls remain that still need to be addressed.
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The chips sector is highly concentrated, with about two thirds of global semiconductor production capacity concentrated in Taiwan, South Korea, Japan, the United States (US) and China, and three operators globally producing leading‑edge logic at commercial scale: TSMC, Samsung Foundry, and Intel.
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The EU is almost entirely dependent on the US and Asia for the most advanced and leading‑edge chips below 5 nanometres – including AI chips. It also remains dependent on design, assembly and packaging, and far behind other regions of the world in terms of spending on chip equipment (see Figure 1).
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In 2024, total chip consumption in the EU reached €55 billion, of which €43.6 billion was imported from third countries. EU‑based production therefore accounts for only 22 % of the EU's overall chip consumption.
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'Lab‑to‑fab' gap persists in the EU, with scaling constraints reinforced by limited private capital, and late‑stage and institutional investment that remain weak.
On the other hand, the chips sector is characterised by interdependencies between the main economic operators in the value chain. For instance, ASML, a world‑leading Dutch company, in 2025 held 100 % of the extreme ultraviolet lithography market, and accounted for around 83 % of worldwide sales of lithography machines, which are essential for the manufacture of advanced semiconductors.
Main points of the proposal
On 3 June 2026, the Commission submitted a proposal for a regulation on a framework of measures for strengthening Europe's semiconductor ecosystem, repealing Regulation (EU)2023/1781. The initiative is accompanied by a (three‑part) impact assessment and an evaluation3 of the current Chips Act.
The proposed regulation introduces a revised policy framework in a bid to attract investment and strengthen advanced semiconductor manufacturing in the EU, as well as to stimulate demand. It also introduces revised rules for improving monitoring and preparedness for semiconductor shortages.
Pillar 1 (the 'chips for Europe initiative 2.0') would reiterate the five operational objectives of the current pillar 1, and add a sixth objective aimed at the development of photonic integrated circuits and associated technologies:
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advanced design platform;
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pilot lines;
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quantum chips (design and validation facilities);
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competence centres and skills development in each EU Member State and Norway;
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chips fund activities for access to finance for start‑ups, scale‑ups and small and medium‑sized enterprises (SMEs);
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design, prototyping and manufacturing of photonic integrated circuits.
Furthermore, the proposal introduces the concept of 'grand challenges' within the chips for Europe initiative 2.0, to improve conditions for investment and competitiveness. These challenges should focus on the development, integration and industrial deployment of promising critical‑semiconductor and related technologies of key importance for the EU, including those underpinning AI, cloud, data‑centre and edge infrastructure.
Other measures are planned under pillar 1 to stimulate demand and industrial uptake. To achieve this, the proposal establishes 'demand accelerators'. It aims to ensure that new semiconductor products are aligned with industry needs and reach the market more quickly, particularly in key markets such as cloud, automotive, aeronautical, telecommunications and defence.
In Annex VI, the Commission sets out a list of 10 key industrial sectors deemed critical for the proper functioning of the internal market that could benefit from a significant strengthening of next‑generation semiconductor technology supply and value chains within the EU. These are: automotive; datacentres, cloud and AI; industrial automation and robotics; aeronautics; space, defence and security; electronic communications infrastructure; industrial‑grade computing and internet of things; healthcare and medical devices; electronic manufacturing services providers and distributors; renewable and low‑carbon energy systems.
One of the tasks would be to improve Europe's chips design capabilities and foster closer cooperation between designers, manufacturers and end‑user industries, with the ultimate aim to facilitate the transition from design to industrial production and commercial deployment within the EU.
The proposal would introduce some specific measures under pillar 2 to achieve the regulation's objectives, including faster permit‑granting procedures for European semiconductor technology initiatives or strategic projects. The permit‑granting procedure would not exceed 12 months, from the moment a complete application has been submitted to the one‑stop shop for permit‑granting procedures, which Member States would designate to serve as a single point of contact. Currently, permitting and design phases for advanced semiconductor facilities in the EU are on average 7.5 months longer than in key competing jurisdictions, which generates substantial cost increases.
Building on the need to strengthen both supply and demand in the European semiconductor ecosystem, the chips act 2.0 would also provide for the deployment of strategic projects (Annex II). These projects would be prioritised and supported through a coordinated mix of public and private investment. They cover the following six priority areas:
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advanced manufacturing (leading‑edge node chip manufacturing with chiplet integration4 and 2.5D/3D packaging);
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AI chips and systems for EU compute infrastructure;
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automotive processor for autonomous driving;
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memory fabrication facility (such as DRAM, NAND and HBM);5
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leading‑edge chip design;
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key segments of the value chain (not limited to the most advanced parts of the value chain but also to address the production of mainstream chips, back‑end processes, printed circuit board (PCB) assembly, and materials and equipment).
Moreover, the Commission had to revise its approach to a key aspect of the first Chips Act, namely the limited scope of 'first‑of‑a‑kind' initiatives. According to pillar 2 of the Chips Act, 'first‑of‑a‑kind' facilities can request the status of integrated production facilities and open‑EU foundries to have access to fast‑track permits for administrative applications and priority access to pilot lines.
The Commission has therefore extended the scope of 'first‑of‑a‑kind' projects to the entire value chain. From now on, they would be eligible for funding for the whole semiconductor chain, from raw materials to advanced packaging and assembly.
Furthermore, to attract investors, the chips act 2.0 would create a new Semiconductor Region of Excellence label for regions with a robust semiconductor investment plan that is aligned with strategic priorities: increasing semiconductor manufacturing, R&D collaboration, skills development, and sustainable infrastructure. This label should be awarded by the Commission following applications by regional authorities. It would signal to international investors that the region has a high‑potential ecosystem for semiconductor‑related business. Recognised regions would be able to join a network of European Semiconductor Regions of Excellence.
To increase supply chain resilience, a business‑to‑business semiconductor supply chain platform would be established under pillar 3. This structure aims to replace the ad‑hoc, crisis‑driven information requests, to reduce duplication and improve coordination across Member States. The platform would enable companies to share non‑commercially sensitive information in an aggregated form, and allow the Commission to anticipate and assess disruptions in a timely and coordinated manner.
The Commission, after consulting the European Semiconductor Board – the governance mechanism overseeing the EU's semiconductor strategy – may propose activating the crisis stage to the Council, which decides by qualified majority. The semiconductor crisis stage is activated when two conditions are met: (i) serious supply chain disruptions causing significant shortages; and (ii) severe impacts on critical sectors (e.g. healthcare, defence, or digital infrastructure). In that case, the Commission may, at the request of two or more Member States, act as a central purchasing body on behalf of all Member States willing to participate for their public procurement of crisis‑relevant products for critical sectors (from energy to security – Annex V).
More generally, the emergency toolbox is strengthened under pillar 3 (including crisis stage activation; assessment and advice by the European Semiconductor Board on appropriate and effective emergency measures; possible imposition of protective measures on the EU's semiconductor sector) while focusing on proactive industry collaboration.
Finally, the regulation would provide for a procedural framework to facilitate combined funding by Member States, without prejudice to State aid rules, the EU budget and private investment.
Parliament's prior position
In its January 2026 resolution on European technological sovereignty and digital infrastructure, the European Parliament expressed concern over excessive dependencies on non‑EU actors in critical sectors such as semiconductors, where market concentration and foreign control risk undermining Europe's competitiveness, democratic resilience and security. It stressed that the EU's industrial and technological policies should prioritise key strategic technologies of the future, such as semiconductors, that contribute to open strategic autonomy and are essential for the green, digital and defence sectors. Parliament called for urgent action to strengthen EU domestic semiconductor manufacturing, including measures to improve supply‑chain resilience through strategic global partnerships, support for start‑ups and innovation, cross‑border collaboration in advanced semiconductor development, and the provision of financial incentives, regulatory support and market access. Parliament also urged that additional funding under the next multiannual financial framework (MFF) be allocated to developing semiconductor production capacities and next‑generation technologies and processes, such as photonic chips, wide‑bandgap chips, as well as design, manufacturing, testing, assembly and advanced packaging, within the EU.
Prior positions of other EU institutions
In its special report 12/2025 on the EU's strategy for microchips, published in April 2025, the European Court of Auditors reached the conclusion, that, despite reasonable progress in implementation, 'the Chips Act is very unlikely to be enough to reach the very ambitious Digital Decade target of a 20 % share in the global market value chain by revenue'. The Court recommended that the Commission carry out an urgent reality check and swiftly begin preparing the next strategy.
On 20 June 2025 the Council adopted its conclusions on the European Court of Auditors' special report. The Council reiterated the need to build and strengthen European value chains including research, innovation and design, manufacturing and advanced packaging of energy‑efficient and secure chips, stimulating competitiveness in semiconductor materials and manufacturing equipment, setting advanced pilot lines for cutting‑edge semiconductors and next‑generation technologies, including photonics, AI and quantum chip technologies. It invited the Commission to carry out a reality check on the strategy and accelerate preparatory work in view of revising the Chips Act in 2026.
In September 2025, the Semiconductor Coalition, composed of the 27 Member States, issued a declaration on the forthcoming revision of the Chips Act that was signed ahead of the EU Competitiveness Council. The declaration called for an 'ambitious semiconductor industry agenda', and mentioned five priorities for strengthening the semiconductor ecosystem: through (i) collaboration, (ii) investment, (iii) skills, (iv) sustainability, and (v) international partnerships.
More than 70 leading European and international semiconductor businesses and/or academic organisations have already endorsed the declaration uniting industry and governments.
Preparation of the proposal
From 5 September to 28 November 2025, the Commission conducted a public consultation and a call for evidence on the first Chips Act in parallel.
The public consultation had both a backward‑looking perspective, on the implementation of the Chips Act, and a forward‑looking one, on possible future steps under a potential chips act 2.0. The organisations and individual respondents emphasised that revising the EU Chips Act must sharpen Europe's strategic focus on semiconductor innovation, industrial deployment, and competitiveness by improving funding tools, reducing bureaucracy, and strengthening collaboration across the value chain.
The call for evidence covered the parallel, or 'back‑to‑back' exercise, of the evaluation of the Chips Act and the impact assessment for its revision.
The proposal was also subject to a three‑part impact assessment (Parts 1, 2 and 3), which identified the initiative's main aim as supporting competitiveness of the EU semiconductors industry along with three options:
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policy option 0, a baseline scenario that would involve the continued implementation of the current Chips Act without any modification;
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policy option 1, based on measures focusing on framework conditions (e.g. fast‑track permitting procedures; European Semiconductor Regions of Excellence label; establishment of a B2B semiconductor supply chain platform; request for information sent to the platform in pre‑crisis stage; labour skills) alongside support for research, development and innovation (R&D&I) through the Chips Joint Undertaking;
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policy option 2, a combination of policy option 1 with a more vertical approach to industrial policy and the possibility of drawing on the proposed European Competitiveness Fund, which will potentially allow direct management funds to support strategic projects focused on industrial deployment. Demand‑side measures such as 'lab‑to‑fab' accelerators and the incentivising of domestic chips or equivalent in public procurement would be covered by policy option 2.
The Commission opted for the latter option ('strategic sovereignty'), combining both horizontal and more targeted vertical instruments, to reinforce the existing Chips Act.
The Regulatory Scrutiny Board (RSB) issued two opinions on the impact assessment. Following a hearing on 28 January 2026, it gave a first negative opinion, identifying two main shortcomings: (i) current and required EU capabilities and production capacities concerning critical elements of the value chain for both mature and leading‑edge chips are not sufficiently analysed; and (ii) the objectives are not clearly defined, in particular in relation to the technological sovereignty desired for the different types of chips.
On 30 March 2026, the RSB Board gave a positive opinion with reservations, which pointed out the need for three improvements: (i) a better description of the measure to incentivise chips in public procurement, to allow for the assessment of impacts; (ii) more clarity on the interaction to achieve synergies between supply‑ and demand‑side measures; and (iii) a comprehensive analysis of the risk of inefficient allocation of resources.
The results from a European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) ex-post analysis of lessons learnt from three years of implementation, show a mixed picture: on the one hand, available evidence suggests that the Chips Act delivered significant outputs, such as the establishment of competence centres and five pilot lines, the establishment of a design platform, and substantial public and private investment commitments in production facilities. On the other, stakeholders have highlighted numerous shortcomings, including persistent demand‑side weaknesses, fragmented procurement, burdensome procedures for permitting and State aid, limited visibility across the full value chain, and incomplete crisis‑response mechanisms.
Stakeholders' points of view
Semi Europe, a trade association representing more than 300 companies in Europe, welcomes the proposed chips act 2.0 because it sends a strong signal aimed at supporting the semiconductor industry and at strengthening Europe's position on the global technological stage. For Semi Europe, the expansion of the 'first‑of‑a‑kind' concept and the measures proposed to accelerate the industrial uptake of R&D and stimulate demand across the semiconductor value chain, while streamlining permitting procedures, show the legislative proposal's overall level of ambition.
DigitalEurope, an international non‑profit trade association representing the digital technology and transforming industries in Europe, welcomes the proposal as a positive step towards strengthening the European semiconductor ecosystem. At the same time, the association notes that the proposal's success critically depends on substantial and predictable funding, which remains to be secured. According to the association, making the EU more attractive to domestic and international investment is essential to boost European competitiveness, indispensability and resilience in the global semiconductor value chain.It supports the shift from a supply‑driven approach to a long‑term strategy to stimulate demand, and insists that Member States should allocate at least €20 billion to an EU semiconductor budget under the next (2028‑2034) MFF.
The Global Electronics Association welcomes the chips act 2.0 proposal as a critical part of the technological sovereignty package that marks a significant evolution in European policy by more fully recognising the need to rebuild Europe's electronics ecosystem from silicon to systems.
The Association for European NanoElectronics Activities, AENEAS, highlights the shift in priorities of the proposed chips act 2.0 with the increased emphasis on demand‑side measures. They estimate that the first Chips Act primarily focused on strengthening manufacturing and research capabilities, while the new proposal seeks to better align European semiconductor production with the needs of strategic industries and emerging markets.
European Parliament supporting analysis
- Lotito, A., The European Chips Act: Lessons learnt from three years of implementation, EPRS, European Parliament, July 2026.
- Ragonnaud, G., Chips act 2.0, EPRS, European Parliament, May 2026.
Other sources
- European Investment Bank, Redesigning supply chains: EU firms in a time of geopolitical risk, 2026.
Endnotes
Classification
Policy areas: Industry | Internal Market and Customs Union
Regions: European Union
Committees: Industry, Research and Energy (ITRE)
Statement on the use of AI
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Disclaimer
This document is prepared for, and addressed to, the Members and staff of the European Parliament as background material to assist them in their parliamentary work. The content of the document is the sole responsibility of its author(s) and any opinions expressed herein should not be taken to represent an official position of the Parliament.
