Transboundary water resources in South Asia Water as an instrument of 'coercive statecraft'?
Summary
The long‑standing, delicate harmony between people and rivers has been put under stress by unsustainable development, the construction of big dams, demography and weak governance, which has been further accelerated by climate change. In the case of transboundary rivers, the countries that are placed closest to the river's source increasingly exploit their geographic advantage, interfering with the flow of the shared river – particularly by building big dams – or polluting its waters. Instead of weaponising water and using it as an instrument of coercive statecraft, it is desirable that countries negotiate water‑sharing deals that guarantee a fair distribution of this key resource for fresh water, agriculture and energy, while taking into account the environmental consequences of deviating flows.
In South Asia, more than one billion people rely on two major transboundary river systems: the Ganges‑Brahmaputra‑Meghna (GBM) and the Indus basins. Both systems' origins are in the Himalayan mountain region, with a large part in the Tibetan plateau governed by China, which is increasingly using its control of the area as strategic leverage. China has no water‑sharing agreements with its neighbours.
Many of the rivers originating from the Himalayan region flow into India, which has concluded two major deals with its neighbours: the Ganges Water Sharing Treaty with Bangladesh and the Indus Water Treaty with Pakistan. Both deals' prospects are currently uncertain, due to geographical constraints, geopolitical rivalries and the need for New Delhi's government to take into account the wishes of different states in India regarding transboundary water resources.
Introduction
Glossary
Upper riparian: Also named upstream riparian, it refers to a country or region located close to the source of a shared river.
Lower riparian: Also named downstream riparian, it refers to a country or region which receives the water coming from an upper riparian.
Watercourse State: The 1997 United Nations (UN) Convention on the Law of the Non-navigational Uses of International Watercourses, which entered into force in August 2014, does not distinguish between upstream and downstream riparians. Instead, it prefers to adopt the expression 'watercourse State' for both upper and lower riparian states. Other neutral terms are riparian State (also used by the convention) or co‑riparian.
Watercourse: While this briefing mostly refers to rivers, a watercourse – as, for instance, defined by the Copernicus Land Monitoring Service – refers to any natural or artificial watercourse serving as a water drainage channel, and includes canals.
Megawatt (MW): It is equal to one million watts.
Gigawatt (GW): It is equal to one billion watts, or 1 000 megawatts.
'The wars of the next century will be fought over water': this was the warning issued by Egyptian Ismail Serageldin then‑Vice‑President of the World Bank, in August 1995. The delicate harmony between people and rivers has been maintained through thousands of years, but this balance has recently been put under pressure by unsustainable development, the construction of big dams, demography and weak governance. Alongside this, indigenous populations and small‑scale fishers that traditionally have played a role in water management and protection are hardly included in decision‑making processes, even though they are frequently the most vulnerable actors. Climate change has further accelerated this trend of disequilibration, including occurrences like prolonged droughts, a decrease in snow cover and glaciers, devastating floods, unpredictable monsoon patterns, and riverbank erosion. The World Meteorological Organization's State of Global Water Resources 2025, published in September 2026, warns that rivers across the globe in 2025 had one of the driest years in more than three decades. Meanwhile, the water cycle has become more erratic and unpredictable, swinging between too little or too great. This makes transboundary water management even more difficult.
The power of being an upper riparian state
The upper riparian states can harm lower riparians by interfering with the flow of the shared river, polluting its waters, or avoiding information transmission. They may either restrict the inflow of water to the lower riparians, affecting their agriculture or navigation, or suddenly release high quantities of water, provoking floods in the downstream riparians. A typical occurrence is the upper riparian country constructing a large dam.
The lower riparian is highly dependent on the use of water and on the information it receives by the upper riparian (although researcher Salman M.A. Salman argues that downstream riparians can also harm upstream riparians, by foreclosing upstream riparians' future uses of water by claiming water rights before them).
Technically, hydropower (a clean, renewable, and environmentally friendly source of energy) does not consume water; the water flows down the river after electricity is generated. However, reservoirs created behind dams can increase water loss through evaporation. Also, hydropower facilities may cause rivers to be diverted and therefore permanently lose part of their natural volume. As a result, local ecosystems and fishing resources could be significantly affected.
An upper riparian country may undertake initiatives without consulting its lower riparian neighbours. Moreover, in the event of strained relations among riparians, water‑sharing is susceptible to being weaponised – even if the countries have an agreement to manage such water resources – including by omitting data‑sharing which is necessary to the counterpart. Recognising the relevance of this risk to sustainable development and peace, the UN's Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) indicator 6.5.2 measures cooperation on both transboundary river and lake basins, as well as transboundary aquifers.
In South Asia, more than one billion people rely on two major transboundary river systems: the Ganges‑Brahmaputra‑Meghna (GBM) and the Indus basins. Both systems' origins are in the Himalayan mountain region, mostly (although not entirely) in the Chinese Tibetan plateau.
The Ganges‑Brahmaputra‑Meghna basin
The Ganges‑Brahmaputra‑Meghna basin is composed of two primary river systems: the Ganges and the Brahmaputra.
The Ganges system
The system follows the 2 500 km Ganges river, originating in the Indian state of Uttarakhand and flowing across northern and eastern India. Before entering Bangladesh, it splits into two major distributaries: one flows though West Bengal's Kolkata; the other enters Bangladesh, becomes the Padma, joins the Jamuna – the main branch of the Brahmaputra – and later the Meghna (whose river course is entirely in Bangladesh). Together, they form the Ganges Delta (the world's largest delta), before reaching the Bay of Bengal.
The Ganges is sacred to Hinduism, and is revered as the embodiment of the goddess Ganga. The annual Ganga Dussera attracts millions of people who take sacred baths and perform evening aarti (a Hindu ritual), with the next one taking place on 13 June 2027. Over 40 % of India's GDP is generated by this densely populated basin. The Indian government is developing projects to address pollution, with the World Bank's support.
At the same time, India benefits from the Ganges' potential to produce energy. From 1961 to 1975, India built the Farakka barrage in West Bengal, some 18 kilometres from the border of what was then East Pakistan (which was then named Bangladesh after the 1971 war of independence from Pakistan). This created a dispute that was eventually solved through the Ganges Water Sharing Treaty of December 1996, which distributes the river's water between the two countries. Designed to remain in force for 30 years – and renewable by mutual consent – it is therefore due to expire in December 2026. The road towards the renewal of the agreement is not easy, as the Indian state of Bihar (the country's second largest state, with a population of 130 million) is against it, and the Indian government has promised to take into account this position.
Transboundary waters and interstate river disputes in India
India is a quasi‑federal country, with 36 subnational entities, 28 states (each with their own government), eight union territories, and one central Union government.
Article 253 of the Indian Constitution gives the Union government (the Centre) the exclusive power to legislate on international treaties, and entry 14 of the Union List outlines how the treaties are implemented. However, since water is a state subject the Centre lacks operational control and needs the state's infrastructure to implement international deals. This explains the impasse on the Teesta river sharing treaty (see below). New Delhi has also invoked water as a state matter to justify its decision not to sign the 1997 UN Watercourses Convention. Bangladesh signed it in 2025, the only South Asian country to do so.
India manages its internal disputes on water through the River Boards Act, which sets up bodies to promote cooperative, interstate management of shared river resources. The Inter‑State River Water Disputes Act (IRWDA) establishes tribunals for settling disputes unresolved through negotiation. Both were adopted in 1956.
The Brahmaputra system
The 2 900 km Brahmaputra river originates in the Chinese region of Tibet, where it is named Yarlung Tsangpo. It then flows into India, enters Bangladesh, where it is named Jamuna, and merges into Padma, which empties into the Bay of Bengal.
In July 2025, China began to build the 60‑gigawatt 'Medog Hydropower Station' on the Yarlung Tsangpo. Its capacity is expected to be three times bigger than that of China's Three Gorges Dam, with Chinese Prime Minister Li Qiang defining it as 'the project of the century'. The project has prompted a great deal of concern in India and Bangladesh. Pema Khandu, the Chief Minister of the Indian State of Arunachal Pradesh,1 warned that it could be used by Beijing as a 'water bomb' and that it represents an existential threat to the region's tribes and livelihoods.2 In addition, even Chinese scientists warned about serious geographical hazards at the construction site, located in one of the world's most earthquake‑prone regions: Professor Brahma Chellaney claims that 'a gigantic reservoir could itself trigger a quake by intensifying geological stresses'. He also warns that 'China is increasingly transforming its control of the Tibetan Plateau – the source of most of Asia's major rivers – into strategic leverage. It has built cascades of dams on transboundary rivers, withheld hydrological data during periods of tension, and resisted entering any water‑sharing treaty with downstream states. Water has become another instrument of coercive statecraft.' The Indian Ministry of Water Resources revealed that no information on hydrological data or hydrological structures has been shared by China with India since 2022. The Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between India and China on the Brahmaputra expired in June 2023 and has not been renewed since.
Originating from the Indian state of Sikkim, the Teesta river flows through West Bengal, then enters Bangladesh: it is a tributary of the Jamuna. As people in the northern parts of West Bengal and Bangladesh are heavily dependent on the Teesta's waters for fishing and farming, India and Bangladesh have been negotiating a water‑sharing deal. They signed an interim agreement in 1983 and were ready to sign a 15‑year agreement in September 2011. However, it could not be formalised due to opposition from West Bengal's Chief Minister Mamata Banerjee, elected a few months beforehand. She has maintained this view over the years – vocally opposing the massive exploitation of the Teesta river in Sikkim. The victory of India's ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in the April 2026 elections in West Bengal, after 15 years of Banerjee's rule, raised hopes in Bangladesh regarding the possibility of signing the agreement on Teesta. Meanwhile, China has proposed to Bangladesh the 'Teesta River Comprehensive Management and Restoration Project' aimed at addressing flooding, erosion, water shortages and river management. Dhaka is hesitant about the proposal, as it may have implications for Bangladesh‑China‑India trilateral relations.
Transboundary Rivers of South Asia (TROSA)
Funded by the Swedish government, the TROSA programme was launched in 2017 with the aim of transforming water governance across the Ganges‑Brahmaputra‑Meghna basin. In phase I, TROSA helped communities secure fairer access to water resources by organising local river dialogues. The second phase of TROSA in 2023‑2026, also called T2:3R (Rivers, Rights, and Resilience), deepened its commitment to strengthening climate resilience and ensuring inclusive governance. Among the programme's outcomes, it helped communities to better adapt to climate change and protect their bodies of water, to build early warning systems to protect households from floods, and supported women emerging as leaders in water governance.
The Indus basin
Originating in China's Tibetan Plateau, the Indus flows for approximately 3 000 kilometres through the Indian‑ and Pakistani‑administered parts of Kashmir, to the Arabian Sea, southeast of Karachi in Pakistan. It is one of the longest rivers in Asia and crosses border zones like the Line of Actual Control and the Line of Control. The World Bank took the initiative to launch negotiations between India and Pakistan, which in 1960 – after nine years of discussions – resulted in the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT). The World Bank is also a signatory through the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD). The treaty allocates the eastern rivers (Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej) to India and the western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab) to Pakistan. At the same time, the IWT allows each country certain uses on the rivers allocated to the other. The treaty did not establish any kind of water-sharing mechanism.
The treaty requires India (upper riparian) to share hydrological data with Pakistan (lower riparian), which are key for flood forecasting and planning for irrigation, hydropower and drinking water. The IWT sets out a mechanism for cooperation and information exchange between the two countries regarding their use of the rivers; the Permanent Indus Commission, which has a Commissioner from each country. The treaty also sets out distinct procedures to handle issues between the parties, which include the Neutral Expert and the Court of Arbitration (CoA) processes.
The IWT has navigated 60 years of bilateral crises, including three wars between India and Pakistan (in 1965, 1971, and 1999). However, after the April 2025 Pahalgam terrorist attack3 in India's Jammu and Kashmir region (an attack against tourists that killed 26 civilians), New Delhi blamed Islamabad and decided to suspend ('put in abeyance') the IWT, citing Pakistan's alleged support of state‑sponsored terrorism as reasons for the move.4.India stopped sharing hydrological data with Pakistan under the treaty's provisions, and in August 2025 New Delhi informed Islamabad about possible cross‑border flooding through diplomatic channels 'on humanitarian grounds' and not through the IWT mechanism.
Meanwhile, a procedure initiated by Pakistan back in August 2016 before the Court of Arbitration was underway – a procedure in which India did not take part – in relation to two Indian hydropower projects in Jammu and Kashmir. On 31 August 2026, the CoA unanimously decided that the IWT remains fully in force and that India's decision on abeyance is not permissible under the treaty or other applicable rules of international law, as they provide for termination or modification, but only on the basis of an agreement reached through the consent of both parties. The court stated that 'there is no material breach of the Treaty in the form of cross‑border terrorist attacks that are allegedly sponsored by Pakistan'. The CoA also granted Pakistan's request for an Order on Interim Measures, limiting construction on one of the two hydropower projects – the Ratle Hydro‑Electric Plant – pending the Neutral Expert's final decision, expected in July 2027.
India rejected the CoA's decision as it considers that the court has been 'illegally‑constituted' and therefore 'has no jurisdiction whatsoever to pronounce on India's sovereign decisions'. India claims that the agreement on the IWT created asymmetric obligations and unequal concessions; while Pakistan was given 80 % of the water, India only received 20 %. New Delhi also argues that Islamabad has 'weaponised' the treaty's provisions to delay Indian hydropower projects in Jammu and Kashmir, a circumstance threatening India's national energy security.
India has been trying in vain to bring Pakistan to renegotiate the treaty, doing so at least four times since January 2023, when the CoA met at The Hague to discuss Pakistan's objections over the two Indian projects. New Delhi declared that there would be no more meetings of the Permanent Indus Commission until the two countries meet for the IWT renegotiation. The last meeting took place in May 2022, despite the IWT mandating that it meets annually.
According to Pakistan, India's rejection of the award by the CoA raises concerns that extend well beyond the present dispute. Islamabad argues that any attempt to deprive Pakistan of the waters allocated under the IWT would have profound consequences for regional peace and security. Pakistan's national security committee declared that any diversion, interruption, and/or reduction in the rights of Pakistan included in the IWT 'will be considered as an act of war'. Pakistan's Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar declared that 17 Indian projects on waterways that are part of the Indus River System would give New Delhi the 'tools for hydro-hegemony'. More than 80 % of Pakistan's agriculture and around a third of its hydropower depend on the Indus basin's water.
Beyond transboundary: Other South Asian countries' hydropower policies
Nepal
Nepal, a land‑locked country, geo‑strategically situated between India and China, is endowed with extraordinary water resources, in particular its 6 000 rivers. This gives it enormous hydropower potential, estimated at 42 000 megawatts (or 42 GW), and that only considers what is economically viable. However, due to its limited financial and technical resources, the country currently has an installed capacity of 4 500 MW. The Balendra Shah government has set an ambitious goal of producing 30 000 MW by 2035, in order to alleviate energy poverty and to foster economic development through boosting export revenue. The government also aims to transform Nepal into a global hub for data centres, artificial intelligence, and computational power, fuelled by the country's hydroelectric energy; rivers could serve as cooling sources for large‑scale data processing.
Since India's independence, despite being Nepal's lower riparian, it has exercised control of Nepal's potential through agreements that have allowed New Delhi to hold unilateral authority over the construction, maintenance, and operation of water infrastructure, including barrages. India's 'hydro‑hegemony' over Nepal aims to maintain its energy security (while securing a regulated water supply for irrigation in its northern states of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh), to such an extent that both the Nepal Electricity Authority and Nepalese private companies are prevented from selling electricity in the Indian market, if such electricity comes from projects financed by China. This obliges Kathmandu to implement careful energy diplomacy between India and China, whose hydropower projects in Nepal have become a significant point of contention in the context of a much wider geopolitical rivalry in the region. Nepal first needs to align with New Delhi's energy objectives, because India is an access point to seaports for international trade, as well as being both the primary buyer and the exclusive transit route for hydropower exports to other countries like Bangladesh. Dhaka agreed to increase Bangladesh's hydropower imports coming from Nepal through India to up to 60 MW in November 2025.
Aiming to expand its influence in South Asia, China has been working with Nepal on several hydropower projects that enhance trans‑Himalayan connectivity, trying to put them in the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). These projects present development opportunities for Nepal. However, Kathmandu has often tried to avoid branding them as BRI projects and prioritises grants over loans, in order to avoid risks related to debt sovereignty and transparency.
Bhutan
Like Nepal, Bhutan is a land‑locked country situated between India and China, which also possesses extraordinary water resources. The country's energy potential is 36 900 MW and it fixed a goal of producing 10 000 MW by 2020, although at present, only one‑tenth of the potential is exploited. Still, hydropower represents 14 % of its gross domestic product (GDP) and 26 % of its revenues; some 80 % of its surplus power is exported to India. Potential weaknesses concern the climate-sensitive nature of this industry: the country's hydropower sector mostly operates on run‑of‑river systems which are susceptible to fluctuating river flows, unlike a reservoir‑based plant. Bhutan is also dependent on the fluctuations of the Indian market and the stability of its relations with New Delhi, which has made a decisive contribution to the development of Bhutan's hydropower sector. The World Bank is also supporting Thimphu's effort to increase the country's hydropower generation. On the contrary, cooperation with China is quite limited: Bhutan has no diplomatic relations with Beijing, and has a longstanding border dispute with China, which has appropriated parts of Bhutanese territory in the Himalayan region. China has done so in the hope of obtaining, in exchange, the Doklam plateau, a strategic position overlooking the Siliguri Corridor, a narrow strip of land connecting India's northeastern states to the rest of India.
Afghanistan
Afghanistan has relatively abundant water resources. However, following decades of war and unrest, the country – run by a regime lacking political recognition – faces severe water scarcity, due to insufficient infrastructure, limited financial capacity and a shortage of expertise in the field, which is quite critical considering that 70 % of the population lives in rural areas and some 60 % of household income comes from agriculture. Around 90 % of its irrigation is managed through the community‑based Mirab system.
Most of Afghanistan's river basins are transboundary, mostly with countries in Central Asia. However, Kabul's vicissitudes have prevented it from participating in agreements regulating water resources in the region. Therefore, the only agreement Afghanistan has negotiated was with Iran on the Helmand River, signed in 1973.
A case apart is the Kabul River Basin. The Kabul's major tributary, the Kunar river, originates in Pakistan (where it is called the Chitral). It flows southwards through Afghanistan, joining the Kabul river, and then re‑enters Pakistan, where it eventually joins the Indus river. Pakistan, most often lower riparian, has built infrastructure in its territory. It has been estimated that it captures up to 70 % of the basin's transboundary flow, leaving the upper riparian Afghanistan with 30 % – all while Afghanistan's hydropower potential remains largely untapped.
In 2015, Afghanistan signed a MoU with China to build a large dam on the Kunar river, which would be jointly exploited by Afghanistan and Pakistan; however, there was no follow‑up. Meanwhile, the possibility of India helping Afghanistan to exploit its potential has triggered apprehension in Pakistan; projects like the Shahtoot Dam near Kabul – a MoU signed in 2021 and still unachieved – could reduce the Kabul river's water flows, which represents a lifeline for Pakistan in terms of irrigation, hydropower, and food security. For this reason, analysts suggest that Pakistan engages with Afghanistan, emphasising regional hydro cooperation, rather than pursuing confrontation, through a mutually beneficial framework for transboundary water management.
Main references
- Pichon, E., Transboundary water governance: Competition and cooperation in a 'water bankruptcy' era, EPRS, European Parliament, April 2026.
Endnotes
Classification
Policy areas: Foreign Affairs
Regions: Asia and Pacific
Committees: Foreign Affairs (AFET)
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