Consolidating data protection rules of EU justice and home affairs bodies Amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1725
Context
European Union (EU) bodies involved in law enforcement, judicial cooperation and border management process highly sensitive personal data. While Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 (the EUDPR) establishes a general data protection framework for Union institutions and bodies, law‑enforcement‑related processing by the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol), the European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation (Eurojust), the European Public Prosecutor's Office (EPPO) and the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex) is governed mainly by the EUDPR's Chapter IX and agency‑specific rules. The European Commission's 2022 review revealed fragmentation in the application of existing rules and identified the need for legislative action.
On 23 June 2026, the Commission proposed amending the EUDPR alongside recasting the Europol and Eurojust regulations. It presents the proposed measures as a largely technical consolidation and streamlining. The proposal would change the EUDPR rules on records of processing and logs of operations, automated decision‑making, data subject requests, notification and documentation of breaches, international transfers of operational personal data, and the powers of the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS).
Legislative proposal
2026/0173(COD) – Proposal for a regulation amending Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 as regards rules applicable to the processing of operational personal data – COM(2026) 314, 23.6.2026.
Next steps in the European Parliament
For the latest developments in this legislative procedure, see the Legislative Train Schedule:
Issue
Regulation (EU) 2018/1725 as regards rules applicable to the processing of operational personal data (the EUDPR) is the principal data protection instrument for Union institutions, bodies, offices and agencies. Its 'law enforcement chapter' (Chapter IX) regulates the processing of 'operational personal data' by EU justice and home affairs (JHA) agencies and bodies, including European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol), the European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation (Eurojust), and – to a limited extent where it performs law enforcement activities – the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex). These rules are supplemented and further specified by provisions in the founding acts of such bodies. In its 2022 EUDPR review, the European Commission concluded that the EUDPR is generally fit for purpose. However, it identified a certain level of fragmentation in the area of data protection rules for EU JHA bodies and agencies, and outlined options to reduce it. In the explanatory memorandum of its proposal, the Commission considers this fragmentation both a legal and an operational problem, which 'not only undermines legal certainty but also creates practical obstacles to effective cooperation' between EU bodies when sharing data. In its review, the Commission proposed to:
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extend the law enforcement chapter to the European Public Prosecutor's Office (EPPO) to improve consistency and minimise fragmentation;
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clarify the EUDPR general provisions' application to operational personal data, unless specific rules provide otherwise, thereby improving legal certainty;
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harmonise the powers of the European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS) over justice and home affairs bodies and agencies by removing provisions governing those powers from their founding acts, allowing the amended EUDPR to apply directly to Eurojust and the EPPO.
The Commission's recent proposal to amend the EUDPR forms part of a broader package of legislative proposals aimed at strengthening the EU's capacity to prevent, detect, investigate and prosecute serious cross‑border crime. The package also includes proposals to reinforce the mandates of Europol and Eurojust, as well as a recast of the Directive on the European Investigation Order. In this context, the EDPS observes that the Europol and Eurojust revisions 'are actually at the core of the current Proposal'.
The proposal largely addresses the issues identified in the Commission's 2022 review. However, unlike the approach suggested in its review, it does not extend all of the EUDPR's general provisions to qualified JHA bodies. Instead, it proposes applying only selected general provisions concerning data protection officers, cooperation and consistency between supervisory authorities, and remedies and penalties. Additionally, the proposal contains amendments that were not yet raised in the review, relating to automated decision‑making, refusal of access requests, log‑keeping obligations for automated processing systems, and international transfer regimes.
Main points of the proposal
The proposal would extend the application of certain general provisions of the EUDPR and lay down rules on accountability, international transfers and supervision. It would also change provisions governing the exercise of individual rights.
Extending select general provisions to JHA bodies and agencies
The proposed Article 2(2) would extend the application of the EUDPR's general provisions on data protection officers, cooperation between supervisory authorities, as well as on remedies and penalties to operational personal data. Specific provisions in a body's founding act would remain applicable.
EUDPR definition of operational personal data
Operational personal data within the meaning of Article 3(2) EUDPR are data processed by Union bodies when carrying out activities within the Treaty fields of judicial cooperation in criminal matters and police cooperation to meet their founding objectives and tasks. The definition does not turn all information held by an agency into operational data.
The proposal would make the application of the new rules to the EPPO conditional on the application of a new EPPO regulation, instead of a revision of its rules under the current Article 98 EUDPR.
Records of processing and logs of automated processing
The proposed Article 87a would require controllers and processors to record the categories of operational processing and provide them to the EDPS upon request. It would also transpose the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) record‑keeping entries and the two additional entries required by the Law Enforcement Directive (LED), including records of profiling and the legal basis. Unlike the general record‑keeping obligation under Article 31 EUDPR, Article 24 LED and proposed Article 87a do not generally oblige qualified controllers and processors to keep their records of processing activities in a central register and make the register publicly accessible.
The amendments to the log‑keeping obligation for automated processing systems appear to be inspired by additional safeguards found in Article 40 Europol Regulation. Recital 11 of the proposed regulation suggests that the logs would be communicated to national competent authorities that supplied the data in the first place, while this is not made explicit in the enacting text. Prescribing that logs cannot be altered would arguably enhance the record's reliability.
Automated decision‑making
To align with the Digital Omnibus proposal, the Commission proposes recasting the prohibition on automated decision‑making, which is subject to certain exceptions, into a conditional permission. In their joint opinion on the Digital Omnibus, the European Data Protection Board (EDPB) and the EDPS pointed out that the Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) has recognised the GDPR's ban on automated decision‑making as a prohibition in principle. In light of this, they called for a wording that reflects this in order to avoid an overly broad interpretation of the provision. They also signalled that the proposed formulation may allow for an excessively permissive interpretation compared with the existing prohibition‑based approach. Beyond these structural changes, the new provision would extend the rule to automated decisions producing legal effects, no longer requiring those effects to be adverse. It would extend the existing obligation to adopt suitable measure to safeguard data subjects' rights and freedoms to also safeguard legitimate interests, in line with the LED. This would reinforce the scope of the provision and the safeguards.
Refusal of data subject requests
Under the current framework, Article 78(4) explicitly allows the refusal of data subject requests where they are 'manifestly unfounded or excessive', for instance due to their repetitive character. However, the envisaged amendment would clarify that access requests under Article 80 may also be refused 'where the data subject abuses the right of access for purposes other than the protection of their data'. In principle, the controller would continue to bear the burden of demonstrating that the refusal is justified. However, the evidentiary threshold for establishing that a request is excessive would be lowered: from demonstrating that it is excessive, it would suffice to show 'reasonable grounds to believe' that it is.
Neither the GDPR nor the LED defines the abuse of the right of access with the requester's motive, as proposed in the proposal. Recital 40 LED illustrates abuse of a data subject's right to receive information with the example of 'providing false or misleading information when making the request'. The EDPB has described 'abusively relying on Art. 15 GDPR' as cases 'in which data subjects make an excessive use of the right of access with the only intent of causing damage or harm to the controller'.
Notification and documentation of breaches
Under the current Article 92(1), a controller must notify the EDPS of a data breach without undue delay and, where possible, within 72 hours, unless the breach 'is unlikely to result in a risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons'. This aligns with the LED. The proposal would require notification only where a breach 'is likely to result in a high risk', and aims to extend the indicative deadline for notification to 96 hours.
Recasting that paragraph around the high‑risk threshold could support a narrower reading of the controller's breach documentation duty, in accordance with Article 92(4) EUDPR. While the proposal would modify the threshold for notifying the EDPS, its implications for the obligation to document breaches below that threshold may require clarification, particularly with a view to ensuring accountability and enabling supervisory verification. The cross‑reference could be read as creating unnecessary and avoidable uncertainty.
International transfers of operational personal data
Article 94 currently establishes three legal bases for international transfers of operational data, while leaving specifications to the legal acts establishing the qualified Union body, office or agency. The proposal replaces this singular provision with a 'uniform set of rules applicable to Union bodies, offices and agencies active in area of the criminal law enforcement and criminal justice, while taking into account their specific operational and legal context, including cooperation agreements' (see Table 1). The envisaged provisions follow the logic of transfer rules in the LED but incorporate specificities from the founding acts of justice and home affairs bodies.
| Provisions | What the provisions permit | Points to note |
|---|---|---|
| General conditions (Article 94) | Transfer only if it is necessary for the Union body's tasks; the recipient is a law enforcement authority; the data originator (Member State or Union body) has authorised the transfer; and any onward transfer is subject to prior authorisation. Additionally, the transfer must be justified by one of the grounds listed in Articles 94a to 94c. | Mutatis mutandis Article 35 LED. The obligation on controllers to keep records of all transfers under Article 94(4) EUDPR would not be re‑enacted. |
| Adequacy (Article 94a) | Transfer to a country the Commission has found adequate | Almost no LED adequacy decisions exist, thereby giving importance to the grounds for Articles 94b to 94d. |
| Appropriate safeguards (Article 94b) | Transfer where legally binding instruments provide appropriate safeguards or the controller has confirmed that appropriate safeguards exist | Closed list of qualifying instruments |
| Derogations (Article 94c) | Transfer where derogations apply for specific situations, e.g. protection of vital interests or prevention of an immediate and serious threat to public security | Drops the LED's legal‑claims ground under Article 38(1)(e) LED; derogations should be interpreted restrictively according to recital 16 |
| Direct transfer (Article 94d) | Transfer to a recipient that is not a law enforcement authority subject to strict conditions | No notification to the supervisor comparable with Article 39(3) LED |
Article 94b(2) closes the list of qualifying instruments to three; two being the legacy cooperation agreements concluded by Eurojust before December 2019 and by Europol before May 2017. F. Boehm has flagged 'that Europol is a very active actor in exchanging data with third countries, and it has so far concluded eighteen data exchange agreements whose standard is far lower than the guarantees included in the LED (or the former Framework Decision)'. In 2022, the Commission carried out a dedicated call for evidence to comply with its task of assessing these agreements; however, it appears that these assessments have not yet been completed. The continued recognition of these agreements would facilitate existing operational cooperation. However, questions arise as to whether the absence of mandatory review mechanisms or sunset clauses would ensure their continued alignment with current EU data protection standards. The EDPS suggests that the 'continued application should be conceived as temporary and adaptation‑oriented from the outset, not as a perpetual exemption'.
Article 94d would permit exceptional transfers directly to recipients in third countries that are not competent law enforcement authorities. Unlike Article 39(3) LED, it would not require prior notification to the supervisory authority. Instead, the transfer would have to be documented, and the documentation made available 'upon request'. As T. Marquenie e xplains, the LED's notification requirement compensates for the absence of prior authorisation by ensuring that the supervisory authority is made aware of the use of derogations. Although access to records enables subsequent scrutiny, it does not proactively alert the EDPS that a transfer has taken place.
The European Data Protection Supervisor's powers
Chapter IX presently does not confer supervisory powers on the EDPS regarding the processing of operational personal data. This is provided for in the founding acts of Europol (Article 43), Eurojust (Article 40), and the EPPO (Article 85). Article 95a of the proposal would extend the Europol model to all Union bodies, offices and agencies covered by Chapter IX. It would set out these powers separately from the EDPS's general supervisory powers over non‑operational administrative data under Article 58 EUDPR. Unlike Article 66 EUDPR, which expressly caps administrative fines for infringements relating to general EUDPR provisions, the proposed rule for operational personal data does not explicitly set a maximum fine for failure to comply with corrective measures. This follows the approach of the current Europol Regulation.
While the proposal consolidates several rules, fragmentation continues. Four provisions on supervisory powers become one, and the officer, records and transfer regimes become shared. However, the EPPO remains outside the framework pending the entry into force of a separate act, which may be tabled in the wake of the EU anti-fraud architecture review. The EUDPR's coordinated supervision provisions do not appear to extend to either the EPPO or Frontex. Moreover, fragmentation persists through the derogations retained by Europol and Eurojust, as Article 2(2) and recital 4 preserve the lex specialis nature of their founding acts.
Parliament's prior position
At the time of writing, Parliament has not adopted a formal position on the proposal.
Parliament already endorsed the core structure of the proposed EDPS powers over Europol by adopting Regulation (EU) 2022/991, which strengthened the EDPS's powers by adding compliance orders, transfer suspension and administrative fines. The proposed Article 95a generalises much of that Europol model. In its 2020 resolution on the security union strategy, Parliament sought full alignment of Europol's data protection regime with the EUDPR, while emphasising political accountability, judicial control and parliamentary scrutiny.
Prior positions of other EU institutions
European Data Protection Supervisor
Under Article 42(1) EUDPR, the Commission must consult the EDPS where a legislative act has an impact on personal data protection. The EDPS delivered its Opinion 17/2026 on the proposal to amend the EUDPR on 11 August 2026, in which it supports the overall objective and the consolidation of supervisory powers, while identifying changes that would make the framework more coherent and effective. The EDPS is concerned about the proposed sequence of alignment with the Digital Omnibus proposal and the LED. It recommends refraining from aligning Chapter IX of the EUDPR with the Digital Omnibus proposal unless corresponding amendments are made to the LED.
Additionally, the EDPS takes issue with some of the envisaged changes under the Digital Omnibus proposal and their extension to the EUDPR. In particular, it warns against changes to the structure of the provision on automated decision‑making. Furthermore, it reiterates its suggestion to establish 'a common template for notifying a personal data breach and a list of circumstances in which a personal data breach is likely to result in a high risk'.
The EDPS supports the intention of streamlining its supervisory tasks and powers. However, it calls on the co‑legislators to clarify that its compliance orders cover both 'processing operations' and non‑processing‑related requirements, including record‑keeping obligations and the designation and position of data protection officers. It suggests adding the possibility of taking interim measures under Article 95a of the proposal to ensure prompt and effective enforcement. Referring to practical obstacles to cooperation with national supervisory authorities, the EDPS recommends clarifying the modalities of cooperation and establishing dedicated mechanisms for cases where such cooperation should be mandatory.
While the EDPS welcomes a comprehensive section on transfer rules, it stresses that Europol's and Eurojust's 'legacy' agreements must ensure a level of protection consistent with current EU data protection law. Their 'continued application should be conceived as temporary and adaptation‑oriented from the outset, not as a perpetual exemption'.
In view of enhanced supervisory tasks, the EDPS calls for additional allocation of both human and financial resources to its services.
Council
The Council has launched its work on the proposal, mapping data protection provisions and compiling comments by Member States. The documents are not public at the time of writing.
Preparation of the proposal
The Commission proposal primarily relies on evidence from its 2022 EUDPR review and targeted stakeholder consultations. While the report offers a useful diagnosis of fragmentation and supervisory inconsistency, it does not examine all the policy changes now proposed. It also fails to identify several of the issues included in the proposal – such as purpose‑based refusal of access, a reduced proof threshold for excessive requests, the recasting of automated decisions, the 96‑hour breach deadline, or the detailed transfer regime – as necessary corrections.
The explanatory memorandum records targeted consultations of Europol, Eurojust, the EPPO, Frontex and the EDPS. It does not specify how comments affected the text.
The Commission considers that the limited scope and largely technical nature of the proposed amendments do not warrant an impact assessment. The impact assessments accompanying the agencies' founding acts and certain legislative amendments covered data protection aspects. Nevertheless, certain proposed changes, including those concerning access requests, breach notification and international transfers, may have implications for data subjects' rights. The Italian Chamber of Deputies has questioned the absence of an impact assessment, and considers its absence a clear breach of Article 5 Protocol No 2 on the application of the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.
Points of view
The Italian Chamber of Deputies argues that an overly rigid and formalistic application of data protection rules obstructs data sharing between Frontex and Europol. In its view, the agencies' agreement of 16 July does not fully resolve the underlying problem. It calls for a new balance between protecting personal data and enabling effective cross‑border crime prevention and law enforcement, particularly against illegal immigration‑related offences, terrorism, and arms and drugs trafficking. The Chamber urges negotiators to carefully assess safeguards for transferring operational data to private entities in third countries, the rules governing their application to Frontex, and the conditions for systematic data sharing between EU agencies such as Frontex and Europol. It also calls for considering whether the EDPS should be required to assess the impact of corrective measures on crime prevention and law enforcement before imposing them.
According to Undersecretary of State at the Ministry of Digital Affairs, Rafał Rosiński, the Polish government welcomes the draft regulation, fully supporting the direction of the proposed changes. However, it will seek to clarify the rules governing cooperation between EU‑level and national supervisory authorities in cases of joint controllership. Undersecretary Rosiński expresses concern about Article 94d, which would allow the direct transfer of sensitive operational data to entities in third countries that are neither law enforcement authorities nor judicial authorities. He warns that this could lead to a lowering of the standards for the protection of citizens' rights.
The Romanian Senate considers the proposal's impact as moderate and predominantly positive. It recommends a clearer demarcation of sector‑specific provisions, i.e. of the founding acts of European JHA bodies and agencies.
European Parliament supporting analysis
- Del Monte, M., Understanding Eurojust: The European Union Agency for Criminal Justice Cooperation, EPRS, European Parliament, 2021.
- Eisele, K. and Takitzi, E., Revising the Europol Regulation: Implementation takeaways, EPRS, European Parliament, April 2026.
- Huemer, M.‑A. with Ricotta, M., The revision of the Eurojust Regulation: Implementation takeaways, EPRS, European Parliament, June 2026.
- Immenkamp, B., Revision of the Eurojust Regulation, EPRS, European Parliament, October 2026.
- Immenkamp, B., Revision of the Europol Regulation, EPRS, European Parliament, September 2026.
- Immenkamp, B., Strengthening Europol's mandate, EPRS, European Parliament, May 2025.
- Immenkamp, B. with Constantinou, E., Europol: The EU law enforcement cooperation agency, EPRS, European Parliament, January 2025.
- Mildebrath, H., Understanding EU data protection policy, EPRS, European Parliament, January 2026.
Classification
Policy areas: Democracy
Committees: Legal Affairs (JURI), Constitutional Affairs (AFCO)
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